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Covert action is a complex tool; planning and conducting effective covert operations can 
be a challenging process. Throughout history, covert actions have been applied with great 
effect in support of state policies, but also sometimes with devastating consequences for 
the sponsor. This thesis takes a systems approach to the study of covert action to help 
explain the divergence between effective and ineffective operations.  
It is demonstrated that, because of the complexities inherent in this policy tool, covert 
action can be best understood as a system, that is, by focusing on the interactions and interplay of 
the system’s components. Four concepts of systems are examined in relation to historic U.S. and 
international examples—the system diagram, system effects, feedback, and tradeoffs. This 
holistic view of covert action may help policymakers better assess the viability and implications 
of a covert strategy and allow for better integration of covert action into foreign policy. 
Ultimately, this thesis aims to advance discourse by developing a formal theory of covert action 
based on the systems approach and offers six “favoring conditions” that can assist policymakers 
when planning and executing covert strategies. 
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More than 13 years after the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (U.S), all 
of them spent in active armed conflict, Americans are tired of war. Thousands of lives 
have been lost, trillions of dollars spent, and an intangible, but significant, amount of U.S. 
international prestige damaged for, arguably, little gain. This domestic weariness has 
been evident in the U.S. response to recent international crises around the world. Despite 
the Syrian regime launching a chemical attack against its own citizens in August of 2013, 
a blatant violation of both international norms and U.S. “red line”1 deterrent threats, the 
majority of the American public was adamantly opposed to any kind of involvement.2 
Months later, in March of 2014, few supported either a direct or indirect military 
response to the Russian annexation of Crimea and its follow-on incursions into Ukraine.3 
And while the U.S. and its coalition partners have recently launched airstrikes to counter 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), public opinion has opposed any large-scale 
intervention to confront this new extremist threat.4 Problematic results of operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have generated in both Americans and the international community 
a strong aversion toward more direct military engagements.  
This aversion is not new, however. There have been periods throughout American 
history when the U.S. has been reluctant to engage openly in the international 
environment. Domestic isolationist attitudes, the support of unpopular regimes, or the 
maintenance of a fragile peace are just a few reasons the U.S. has avoided direct 
involvement. These reasons, however, do not lessen the perceived need to influence the 
                                                 
1 The White House, “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps," August 20, 2012. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps.  
2 Scott Clement, “Most in US Oppose Syrian Strike, Post-ABC Poll Finds,” The Washington Post, 
September 3, 2013. 
3 “Bipartisan Support for Increased U.S. Sanctions Against Russia: Most Oppose Military Aid to 
Ukraine,” Pew Research, April 28, 2014. http://www.people-press.org/2014/04/28/bipartisan-support-for-
increased-u-s-sanctions-against-russia/.  
4 Mark Preston, “Poll: Americans Back Airstrikes, but Oppose Use of U.S. Troops in Syria, Iraq,” 
CNN, September 29, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/29/politics/poll-americans-back-airstrikes/.  
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global community in support of U.S. interests. The Cold War is perhaps the best example 
where direct military intervention was seldom feasible or desirable, yet international 
influence was still essential. The U.S. could not risk a nuclear confrontation with the 
Soviet Union, but neither could it risk the unchecked expansion of the communist system. 
To address this dilemma of influence without open intervention, covert action has often 
been applied.  
Covert action is defined in official U.S. policy as “an activity or activities of the 
United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, 
where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or 
acknowledged publicly.”5 Used correctly, covert action can be a highly effective foreign 
policy instrument. Covert action, however, is a complex tool, and planning and 
conducting effective operations is a challenging process. Once executed, determining the 
operational effectiveness of a concept as deeply buried in secrecy as covert action can be 
even more difficult as assessments often devolve into emotional arguments about the 
quality of the policy the covert action is supporting, not of the action itself. For example, 
discussions about the effectiveness of the covert intervention in the Angolan Civil War in 
1975 are often overshadowed by debates focused on the partnership between the U.S. and 
the South African apartheid regime.6 The challenge of determining whether, when, 
where, and how covert actions will be most useful must be mastered, however, if this tool 
of statecraft is to be applied appropriately.  
Because of the complexities inherent in covert action, it will be shown that an 
effective, but hitherto untried, method of assessing a covert action strategy is through a 
systems approach framework. A systems approach focuses on the “design of the whole”7 
and studies the interactions of the internal components of a system to understand how 
those interactions influence each other, and ultimately, the outcome. Instead of viewing 
components in isolation, the systems approach considers the interaction itself as the unit 
                                                 
5 The National Security Act of 1947, [50 U.S.C 413b] Sec 503(e).  
6 Gregory Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 212-214. 
7 Simon Ramo, The Systems Approach: Fresh Solutions to Complex Problems Through Combining 
Science and Practical Common Sense (Anaheim, CA: KNI, Inc., 1998), 16. 
 3 
of analysis. Analyzing the complex interplay of the covert action’s components and 
tradeoffs and visualizing how those elements impact overall effectiveness may ultimately 
lead to a better integration of covert action into U.S. foreign policy.  
B. BACKGROUND 
In 1961, President Kennedy summed up the prevailing attitude toward covert 
action when he said, “I don’t care what it is, but if I need some material fast or an idea 
fast, the CIA is the place to go.”8 Since General Washington first dispatched a saboteur to 
enter England under a false passport and set fire to a naval shipyard, U.S. presidents have 
used covert action to defend American interests.9 There have been many successful 
covert actions over the years, but just as many failures. The TPAJAX operation to 
remove Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq and the PBSUCCESS operation to replace 
Guatemalan President Arbenz were, at least initially, considered highpoints of covert 
action success.10 More recently, the Stuxnet cyber attack on Iranian nuclear centrifuges in 
2010, while still officially unacknowledged, is viewed as a success by many.11 
Paralleling these achievements have been many abject failures as well, to include 
numerous unsuccessful attempts to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba,12 a botched coup to 
replace President Allende in Chile,13 and an intensive, yet ineffective, anti-Saddam 
campaign in Iraq.14  
                                                 
8 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign 
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 20. 
9 Stephen F. Knott, Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 22. 
10 Gregory Treverton, Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Post-War World (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1987), 176. 
11 While many view Stuxnet as a success, others see it as causing only temporary delay in the Iranian 
nuclear program as well as sparking Iranian cyber retaliation. William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David 
E. Sanger, "Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay,” The New York Times, January 11, 
2011. According to The New York Times article “In Cyberattack on Saudi Firm, U.S. sees Iran Firing Back” 
(Nicole Perlroth, October 23, 2012) Iran has been linked to the Shamoon virus in “what is regarded as 
among the most destructive acts of computer sabotage on a company to date.”  
12 John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II 
through the Persian Gulf (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996), 194–217. 
13 Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, 315–321.  
14 John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 597–
605.  
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Covert action is often seen as a “middle option,”15 between “doing nothing in a 
situation in which vital interests may be threatened and sending in military force.”16 Such 
a seemingly simple view of covert action can lead to a misunderstanding and 
misapplication of this potentially powerful tool. President Kennedy, entering the White 
House fresh off a campaign platform offering a more aggressive stance towards 
communism, felt the need to “do something” with respect to the perceived communist 
threat in Cuba. This need led to his willingness to execute the “on the shelf” plan to 
overthrow Fidel Castro that ended in the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. Similarly, 
President Reagan felt the need to “do something” to assist the Contra “freedom 
fighters”17 in Nicaragua. This need led to the Iran-Contra Affair and the blatant violation 
of U.S. laws by the National Security Council.18  
The perceived need to “do something” coupled with the ability to “do something 
secretly” can elicit a strong emotional response from policymakers that has the potential 
to overshadow dispassionate discourse. John Nutter highlights the allure of covert action 
by explaining that, “across time, American presidents have found it difficult, if not 
impossible, to resist the call of covert action.”19 The “call” can often drown out other, 
less intriguing, options. Gregory Treverton explains, “perhaps because it is both secret 
and emotional, covert action is too seldom the subject of hard thought.”20 This lack of 
“hard thought,” of a systemic and analytical approach to the factors influencing covert 
action effectiveness and how those factors may better inform decision makers, is what is 
most concerning. To avoid more covert action setbacks on the scale of the failed 
paramilitary operation at the Bay of Pigs, the assassination plots and other questionable 
                                                 
15 David Isenberg, The Pitfalls of U.S. Covert Action (Washington, DC: Cato Institute Policy Analysis, 
1989). 
16 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012), 181. 
17 Steven R. Weisman, “President Calls Nicaraguan Rebels Freedom Fighters,” The New York Times, 
May 5, 1983. 
18 Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, 
Minority, and Additional Views, 100 Cong., (1987). 
19 John J. Nutter, The CIA’s Black Ops: Covert Action, Foreign Policy, and Democracy (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2000), 44. 
20 Treverton, Covert Action, 6. 
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activities detailed in the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Family Jewels report,21 or 
the mining of the Nicaraguan harbor despite the Congressional restrictions of the Boland 
Amendments,22 a structured, objective, and systemic approach should be developed and 
applied to the study, planning, and execution of covert action. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design outlined below will be employed throughout this thesis.  
1. Identify the Problem 
Numerous historical studies exist that analyze why a particular covert action 
succeeded or failed. Unfortunately, detailed step-by-step accounts of specific covert 
actions may provide only limited insights for planners and decision makers. Without 
identifying generalizable components, tactical details of why a specific covert action 
succeeded in one situation or failed in another will have little merit beyond historical 
interest. For example, without a framework through which to view the overarching 
components of covert action, a thorough study of why a covert political action failed to 
influence the 1970 national elections in Chile23 will likely provide little insight into how 
a covert political action might influence future elections in Venezuela. Covert action 
analysis has become more akin to post-mortem assessments of specific operations as 
opposed to providing “useable knowledge”24 for future policymakers. While interesting, 
these stand-alone studies might be made even more relevant by the development of a 
formal theory of covert action.  
Furthermore, covert action effectiveness is often viewed through the lens of 
counterfactual arguments. The effectiveness of the mission to overthrow Iranian Prime 
Minister Mossadeq in 1953 is the subject of this sort of debate. Some argue it was very 
                                                 
21 Central Intelligence Agency, Family Jewels, May 16, 1973. 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001451843.pdf.  
22 Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, 411–414.  
23 Treverton, Covert Action, 103. 
24 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 269. 
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effective because it provided a bulwark against communism in the Middle East for 25 
years.25 Others argue it was ineffective because it enabled the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini 
and the eventual Islamic revolution.26 Similarly, some believe that arming the 
Mujahedeen in the 1980s was worth the risk because it accelerated the defeat of the 
Soviet military in Afghanistan; others believe that training and equipping this Islamic 
group was indirectly responsible for the emergence of al Qaeda and the September 11th 
terrorist attacks.27 These assessments are more often based on the opinions surrounding 
the foreign policy being implemented, not on how effective the action was in achieving 
those policy objectives. Covert action is only as strong as the policy it supports and in 
some cases “most of the blame or credit lies with American foreign policy, not with 
covert action.”28  
Operational effectiveness must therefore be separated from ultimate success. 
Success and failure are reflections of policy, whereas effectiveness is primarily a 
reflection of the strategy itself. The covert operation to overthrow Guatemalan President 
Arbenz in 1954 is considered extremely effective by most analysts, marking an “early 
zenith in the Agency’s long record of covert action.”29 The coup, however, replaced a 
democratically elected government with a military junta under the command of Colonel 
Castillo Armas. Castillo Armas immediately swung to the extreme right and ushered in a 
period of domestic upheaval in Guatemala. As Nick Cullather points out, “PBSUCCESS 
thwarted the long-term objective of producing a stable, non-Communist Guatemala.”30 
So while the covert action in Guatemala achieved the objectives set forth and should 
therefore be considered effective, the foreign policy the action supported was arguably a 
failure. There appears to be much discussion about covert action success and failure, but 
                                                 
25 Treverton, Covert Action, 176. 
26 Thomas Powers, Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to al-Qaeda (New York: 
New York Review of Books, 2002), 154. 
27 Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, 216. 
28 Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, 214. 
29 Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala 1952–
1954 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 7. 
30 Cullather, Secret History, 117. 
 7 
no clear framework has emerged, as yet, to determine covert action effectiveness. This 
lack of a framework for assessing covert actions and determining when and how best to 
implement covert strategies to support larger foreign policy efforts can lead to a 
misapplication of the capability.  
2. Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze covert action as a system. Robert Jervis 
explains that “we cannot understand systems by examining only the attributes and goals 
of the interconnected elements”31 but must look at how those elements affect each other. 
Viewing covert action as a complex system of interrelated components, versus a simple 
tool of non-related elements, is not groundbreaking, but as Jervis notes, “scholars and 
statesmen, as well as the general public are prone to think in non-systemic terms” even 
when dealing with known complexities.32 Analyzing the components, interactions and 
tradeoffs as a system may therefore enable a better assessment of covert action as a 
policy option.  
The analytical method employed in this thesis will be a heuristic, historical 
approach using conditional analysis to illustrate how systems thinking may improve 
understanding of covert action. The spectrum of covert action will be viewed over three 
historical periods and will include both U.S. and international examples: pre-World War 
Two, the Cold War era, and the post-Cold War period. Each time period will highlight a 
specific aspect of the systems approach: the system diagram, system effects, feedback, 
and tradeoffs. Ultimately, the goal of this thesis is to create a formal theory of covert 
action that will provide decision makers with a fresh perspective to assess the viability 
and implications of a covert action strategy.  
                                                 
31 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 29. 
32 Jervis, System Effects, 295. 
 8 
3. Research Questions 
How do the covert action system’s components, interactions and tradeoffs impact 
effectiveness? How can an understanding of these interactions and tradeoffs assist future 
planners and decision makers? 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This thesis is based in part on the existing academic literature of covert action and 
systems approach studies.  
1. Covert Action 
As stated previously, covert action has been a policy option for U.S. presidents 
since the foundation of the republic. Stephen Knott explains in Secret and Sanctioned: 
Covert Operations and the American Presidency that as far back as Presidents 
Washington and Jefferson, the U.S. government was executing covert operations. 
Jefferson, the classic defender of democratic ideals, “saw no contradiction between his 
love of democratic government and his use of surreptitious means to advance its 
cause.”33 Indeed, the issues decision makers face now with regard to covert action are 
uncannily similar to what faced early leaders: When should a covert action be undertaken 
in lieu of other instruments of foreign policy? What factors lead to an effective covert 
action? And how can policymakers better incorporate covert action into the larger 
national security strategy?  
Despite the long historical experience the U.S. has had with covert action, there 
appears to be no common framework for addressing the whether, when, what, and how. 
In fact, the term “covert action” itself is often misunderstood. Covert is not simply 
“secret,” it is intended to be unacknowledged. This distinction highlights the difference 
between secrecy for security and secrecy for deniability. Many military operations will be 
kept secret during the planning and execution phase to ensure operational security; 
however, only a covert action will be executed with the expressed intent to hide U.S. 
involvement after execution. Mark Lowenthal explains in his book, Intelligence: From 
                                                 
33 Knott, Secret and Sanctioned, 82. 
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Secrets to Policy, that the term “covert action” is intentionally vague in U.S. law to cover 
a spectrum of activities, all with the intent to conceal the role of the U.S.34 Lowenthal 
illustrates this spectrum with the “covert action ladder,”35 graduated levels of covert 
options starting with propaganda and climbing through political activity, economic 
activity, sabotage, government coups and ultimately ending in paramilitary operations. 
Although this “covert action ladder” is not formally accepted doctrine, most academics 
and intelligence professionals agree that covert actions encompass a range of activities 
varying in degrees of violence and plausible deniability.36  
What academics and intelligence professionals disagree on, however, is whether a 
theory of intelligence, let alone of covert action, can be developed. The Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, in partnership with the RAND Corporation, held a 
conference in 2005 entitled “Toward a Theory of Intelligence.”37 This conference of 
leading policymakers, academics, and intelligence professionals showed that there is little 
agreement here. In fact, covert action was seen by some as “better understood as policy 
execution”38 than intelligence, and not likely to be included in any overarching theory. 
One outcome of this conference was that “while some questioned the utility of exploring 
theories on intelligence, others insisted that it is possible to establish causal relationships 
between intelligence and certain outcomes, and felt that exploring these relationships was 
essential to improving intelligence.”39 It does not appear that this exploration of “causal 
relationships” has yet proceeded to the point of encompassing the systemic properties of 
covert action.  
John Nutter lists six reasons, in The CIA’s Black Ops: Covert Action, Foreign 
Policy, and Diplomacy, why U.S. policymakers may undertake covert action. They range 
                                                 
34 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 187. Note: The terms covert and clandestine are often, incorrectly, used 
interchangeably. “Covert” refers to visible actions whose sponsor is unknown or unacknowledged while 
“clandestine” refers to secret, non-visible actions.  
35 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 187. 
36 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 181. 
37 George T. Treverton et al., Toward a Theory of Intelligence (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 
2006). 
38 Treverton et al., Toward a Theory of Intelligence, 8. 
39 Treverton et al., Toward a Theory of Intelligence, 30. 
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from avoiding open intervention or confrontation that may elicit counter-intervention to 
carrying out policies that, while promoting U.S. national security, may violate domestic 
or international law.40 As both Nutter and Lowenthal highlight, there is much discussion 
in the literature about when the U.S. could undertake covert action but there is little 
discussion of when it should be based on a comprehensive understanding of covert action 
as a complex system.  
There also appears to be little analysis of any themes or commonalities running 
through the typology of covert action and how those factors interact with each other. Nor 
does there seem to be any attempt to identify a generalizable set of principles about those 
interactions and how they might affect the outcome of an operation. Many authors and 
academics have explored reasons for success and failure; few have considered how 
effectiveness is influenced by the interaction of common components across the spectrum 
of covert activities.  
An abundance of literature also exists detailing the historical use of covert action 
since World War Two.41 These studies, however, are typically written as ex post facto 
assessments of particular cases. For example, Kermit Roosevelt’s report of the CIA-
sponsored overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq in Countercoup is an 
intriguing, though somewhat personally biased, account of Operation TPAJAX.42 
Similarly, Nick Cullather’s book Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its 
Operations in Guatemala 1952–1954 is an excellent review of Operation PBSUCCESS 
based on declassified CIA documents.43 Failed operations garner even more attention. 
After the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy remarked, “victory has a hundred 
                                                 
40 Nutter, The CIA’s Black Ops, 276. 
41 Among the lengthy list of books devoted to covert action case studies are John Prados, Safe for 
Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006). William Daugherty, Executive 
Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004). 
Harry Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1988). Jay Peterzell, Reagan’s Secret Wars (Washington, DC: The Center for 
National Security Studies, 1984). 
42 Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). 
43 Cullather, Secret History. 
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fathers and defeat is an orphan.”44 Defeat may be an orphan but it has plenty of 
biographers. Scores of studies are published on failed covert operations throughout U.S. 
history. Illustrative of this trend, John Prados’ book of covert action case studies 
Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II 
Through the Persian Gulf is a thorough account of U.S. covert actions from the late 
1940s to the late 1980s. Many of the cases he highlights are considered failures.45 While 
these accounts offer insightful analyses of the tactical events that led to the outcome, 
most do not extrapolate beyond the confines of the particular operation being considered.  
Overall, most covert action literature focuses on one of four areas: typology, time 
period, case study, or process. No study has yet merged these areas to develop a systems 
understanding of covert action. To fill this gap, this thesis will integrate these common 
approaches to develop a theory of covert action effectiveness based on the systems 
approach.  
2. A Systems Approach 
Ludwig von Bertalannfy’s general systems theory provides the basis of the 
systems approach. This theory was developed in the mid-twentieth century to expand 
scientific thinking beyond the reductionist focus that had become commonplace with the 
scientific method.46 The systems approach uses the foundation of general systems theory 
to posit that complex issues can be better understood not by breaking down a system to 
its component parts but instead by looking at the system as a whole and focusing on the 
interactions and interplay of those elements. 
David Easton, in A Systems Analysis of Political Life,47 and Robert Jervis, in 
System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, use the systems approach to 
analyze broad, macro-level political systems. Easton looks at how inputs, outputs, stress, 
                                                 
44 John F. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations.aspx.  
45 Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars. 
46 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, “An Outline of General Systems Theory,” The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 1, no. 2 (August 1950): 134–136. 
47 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965). 
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environment, and feedback impact the “open and adaptive”48 political system of a state. 
Jervis retracts the lens even farther to consider how international relations can be better 
understood by studying emergent behavior, system effects, and feedback, concluding that 
commonly applied linear thinking is inappropriate to understanding complex 
international political systems. Both Easton and Jervis remain at the macro-level of 
analysis and rarely drop down to the “middle range”49 theories that are more applicable 
to policy execution. 
C. West Churchman, in his book The Systems Approach,50 applies this method to 
more practical matters of daily life as opposed to the broad theoretical studies of Easton 
and Jervis. Doing so, he also details the need to view complex problems as a system: “the 
ultimate aim of component thinking is to discover those components whose measures of 
performance are truly related to the measure of performance of the overall system.”51 
While Churchman is discussing management science, this theme can be applied to covert 
action. To paraphrase, the aim of a systems approach to covert action is to discover what 
factors significantly impact the overall effectiveness of operations across the spectrum of 
activities. But simply discovering those components is not enough; one must understand 
the interactions amongst the components. System outcome are not linearly related; A plus 
B does not necessarily equal C. Instead, because components within systems are 
interconnected so that changes in one element produce changes in other elements to 
where “systemic outcomes are the product of the interaction of multiple factors,”52 the 
influence of the interactions must be considered. All components that affect a covert 
action must be taken into account in relation to each other, not simply in relation to the 
desired outcome. In other words, the whole is different than the sum of its parts. 
Despite the potentially useful insights a systems approach may provide, covert 
action has yet to be analyzed from this perspective. The failure to view complex issues as 
                                                 
48 Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, 17.  
49 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 266. 
50 C. West Churchman, The Systems Approach (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1983). 
51 Churchman, The Systems Approach, 43. 
52 Jervis, System Effects, 79. 
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integrated systems, however, is not unusual. As Jervis explains, “Although we all know 
that social life and politics constitute systems and that many outcomes are the unintended 
consequence of complex interactions, the basic ideas of systems do not come readily to 
mind and so often are ignored.”53 Ignoring complex interactions can have devastating 
effects, especially when those effects resonate throughout the international community.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This study will use a heuristic approach to analyze covert action as a system in 
order to determine how internal components and tradeoffs impact overall system 
effectiveness. The focus will be on covert actions conducted during periods of “peace.” 
Peacetime is an admittedly vague concept; for the purpose of this thesis, “peacetime” is 
understood to mean the absence of active armed conflict by conventional armed forces. 
Politically, covert action has much more value in a peacetime environment; the need to, 
and the benefits of, keeping the government’s role unacknowledged are much greater 
during a time of peace than during a time of open conflict. For this reason, covert actions 
mounted during both world wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Desert Storm, and 
the most recent Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts will not be addressed. U.S. and 
international experiences will be divided into seven separate types of covert action over 
three periods: pre-World War Two, the Cold War era, and the post-Cold War period. 
Each period will then be used to highlight a specific concept of the systems approach: the 
system diagram, system effects, feedback, and tradeoffs. Table 1 provides examples of 
the type of covert action conducted over these timeframes. These cases, among others, 






                                                 
53 Jervis, System Effects, 3. 
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Covert Action Typology and Timeframes 
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Table 1.   Covert action typology, timeframe, and associated examples.  
 
Chapter II will first discuss the systems approach, introduce the system diagram, 
and briefly explain the concepts of system effects, feedback, and tradeoffs. Chapter III 
will then apply the system diagram to four pre-World War Two examples to demonstrate 
how a dynamic concept can be visualized through a simple diagram without eliminating 
the complex interactions that define systems. Chapter IV will focus on Jervis’s “system 
effects” that are common to most social systems by using Cold War cases to illustrate 
how these emergent properties influence the outcome of covert actions. Chapter V will 
then consider the concept of feedback and tradeoffs within the system by concentrating 
on post-Cold War vignettes.  
Finally, it is important to “bridge the gap”54 between theory and practice by 
transitioning this systems analytic approach into a relevant tool for policymakers. Chapter 
                                                 





























VI will make this leap. The key, as Alexander George states, is that “theory and generic 
knowledge are best understood as a source of inputs to policy analysis of specific 
problems within the government. They are an aid, not a substitute for policy analysis and 
for judgments that decision makers make when choosing a policy.”55 Viewing covert 
action as a system will not provide an exact model that can prescribe the correct course of 
action for policymakers. Instead, it will offer a “general logic associated with successful 
use of a policy tool.”56 Understanding the logic of the system may give policymakers 
insight into the potential outcomes of their decisions and perhaps help them better 
determine when a covert action is a viable policy option and when other instruments of 




                                                 
55 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 276. 
56 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 270. 
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II. THE COVERT ACTION SYSTEM 
A. SYSTEMS—DEFINED AND EXPLAINED 
A system is a simple concept with complex implications. Systems are found in all 
aspects of life, ranging from natural organisms to manmade organizations, and from 
physical entities to vague concepts. Donella Meadows defines a system as an 
“interconnected set of elements that is coherently organized in a way that achieves 
something.”57 She further describes the system by explaining that it “must consist of 
three kinds of things: elements, interconnections, and a function or purpose.”58 A system 
is not simply a collection of parts. It is the interconnection of those parts, either natural or 
manmade, for a purpose that differentiates a system from an aggregation.  
Before examining the “three kinds of things” that make up a system, it is 
necessary to understand a system’s structure because “structure is key to understanding 
not just what is happening, but why.”59 The system’s structure is its overall organization, 
incorporating the system’s boundaries, the placement of its components, and the 
interactions amongst those components. Nearly all systems are “open systems,”60 that is, 
they interact with their environment making them subsystems of larger, more complex 
systems. This layered, interconnected view of the world can make the analytic task 
overwhelming if structure and boundaries are not first clearly defined. To avoid 
unnecessary complexity, one must seek out the “deep structure”61 that drives the system, 
distinguishing from the external environment those particular components and 
interactions that specifically impact the function and purpose. There are rarely physical 
boundaries that separate deep structure from the external environment. It is purely 
                                                 
57 Donella Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishing Company, 2008), 12. 
58 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 12. 
59 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 89. 
60 Robert Edson, System Thinking. Applied. A Primer (Applied Systems Thinking Institute: Analytic 
Services, Inc., 2008), 49.  
61 Nancy Roberts, “Tackling Wicked Problems with Systems Thinking,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 5 May 2014). 
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dependent on the needs of the study, which makes delineating the system structure a 
subjective yet critical step to take before further inquiry can progress.  
Once structure is defined, determining the system’s components and interactions 
is the next step toward understanding. However, choosing which components to examine 
can often be just as difficult as outlining the structure. The key components are those that 
directly affect the overall function of the system. Once again, it is a subjective exercise 
with no clear distinction between critical and peripheral components. A study should only 
focus on “those components whose measures of performance are truly related to the 
measure of performance of the overall system.”62 Focusing on parts that have little 
analytical value to the study of the whole can quickly make analysis overly complicated. 
It is therefore important to refine the approach to consider only the critical elements as 
determined by the needs of the study. The second part of the system, its interactions, is 
the driving force behind the system; without interactions, a group of parts is simply a 
collection of pieces, not a true system. Interactions occur through “the transmission and 
return of information,”63 and it is this feedback that is the catalyst for change in system 
behavior.64 It is important to clearly distinguish between interactions and feedback. 
Interactions are relationships while feedback is information. Interactions between 
components create feedback; feedback then influences future interactions. Finally, all 
systems must have a function or purpose. Whether natural or manmade, without a 
continuing purpose, the system would cease to exist.  
Systems behave in ways that cannot be understood by simply analyzing their 
separate components. It is the relationship amongst these parts that creates emergent 
properties, “a characteristic that could not possibly have been deduced from the nature of 
its components; it is a new characteristic that is attributable only to the structural 
organization…of its component parts (and which can be called) ‘emergent’.”65 
                                                 
62 Churchman, The Systems Approach, 43. 
63 Virginia Anderson and Lauren Johnson, Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops 
(Waltham, MA: Pegasus Communications, Inc., 1997), 4. 
64 Anderson and Johnson, Systems Thinking Basics, 4. 
65 Reuben Albowitz, as quoted in Jervis, System Effects, 16. 
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Reductionist thinking, breaking a complex problem down to its basic components in an 
attempt to understand the overall issue, does not account for the emergent properties of 
systems. For example, having a complete understanding of automobiles, freeways, 
highway patrols, drivers, and rest stops does not provide a comprehensive understanding 
of the U.S. interstate system; it is the interaction and interrelation of these components 
that creates the emergent properties that characterize this efficient transportation system.  
B. THE SYSTEMS APPROACH AND SYSTEMS THINKING 
C. West Churchman traces the systems approach back over 4,000 years to the 
Chinese I Ching, or Book of Changes, a manuscript that he describes as “an amazingly 
astute systems management document.”66 It was not until the mid-twentieth century, 
however, when Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy developed general systems 
theory in an attempt to unify the various scientific disciplines with an overarching theory 
of systems behavior. Bertalanffy denounced reductionist thinking, believing instead that 
the world could be better understood by discerning how component organization and 
interactions impact the whole as opposed to the linear type of thinking that was the 
foundation of the classic scientific approach.67 While general systems theory attempts to 
discover the laws of behavior inherent in all systems through formal mathematical 
modeling, the systems approach is a much more user-friendly “application of logic and 
common sense resting on a sound foundation”68 of Bertalanffy’s theory. The systems 
approach remained in the “hard science” disciplines until the 1960s when Churchman 
pioneered its potential for tackling social issues like world hunger and poverty. No longer 
was the systems approach confined to the physical world of science and engineering; it 
was now being applied to increasingly complex social problems.  
A systems approach is simply a way of “looking at a problem in its entirety, 
taking into account all the facets, all the intertwined parameters. It seeks to understand 
                                                 
66 While Churchman considers I Ching to be an early systems management document, it should be 
noted that it is primarily a divination text that uses symbols and numbers to illustrate the interconnections 
of the universe. Thus, the I Ching employs a “systems approach.” C. West Churchman, The Systems 
Approach and Its Enemies (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1979), 32.  
67 Bertalanffy, “An Outline of General Systems Theory,” 134–136. 
68 Ramo, The Systems Approach, 16–17. 
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how they interact with one another and how they can be brought into proper relationship 
for the optimum solution of the problem.”69 Instead of using reductionist thinking to 
attempt to understand complexities, a systems approach focuses on the interactions and 
relationships of the parts. As Figure 1 illustrates, the systems approach retracts the lens to 
consider not just what A, B, and C are, but how A, B, and C interact and interrelate to 
affect the whole.  
 
Figure 1.  The systems approach. 
The systems approach focuses on the interactions amongst components and between the 
system and its environment to better understand system behavior and outcomes. 
From the systems approach emerges systems thinking. John Boardman and Brian 
Sauser explain two sides of systems thinking: thinking about systems and thinking from 
systems.70 Thinking about systems entails using “the tools we have acquired for 
                                                 
69 Ramo, The Systems Approach, 16. 
70 John Boardman and Brian Sauser, Systems Thinking: Coping With 21st Century Problems (Boca 
Rotan, FL: CRC Press, 2008), xix. 
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cognizing, analyzing, and synthesizing to ruminate on the systems that confront us”71 in 
order to understand how and why things operate the way they do. Once systems are 
understood, one can think from that system, using “systems, captured in diagrammatic 
form…to focus our thinking on the very issues that gave rise to our need to think, and 
subsequently, to act.”72 This dual approach will be taken with the covert action system. 
First, an understanding of what the covert action system is and why it operates the way it 
does will be established; from that understanding, policymakers can better comprehend 
the implications of a covert action policy and perhaps offer more informed 
recommendations to decision makers. 
A similar way to think about the systems approach is to compare event thinking 
with structural thinking. Anderson and Johnson argue that humans live in an “event-
focused society,”73 viewing specific occurrences in a vacuum and ignoring the causal 
web of events; but “by uncovering the elusive systemic structure that drives events, you 
can begin identifying higher-leverage actions.”74 Structural thinking, or systems thinking, 
widens the analyst’s perspective to view the entire structure surrounding an event, not 
simply the event itself, ultimately providing a deeper understanding of the issue.  
In the world of covert action, event thinking focuses on the visible, immediate 
result, while system thinking takes into account all stakeholders, factors, interactions, and 
outcomes that led to and resulted from that action. For example, an event thinking 
approach to the alleged Israeli-sponsored assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists 
beginning in 2007 would focus on the killing of the scientists in the streets of Tehran.75 
Conversely, a structural thinking approach would consider the complete system that 
surrounded the event: who gave the approval, how the decision was made, why those 
particular scientists were targeted, why assassination was chosen, how the cover story 
                                                 
71 Boardman and Sauser, Systems Thinking, xix. 
72 Boardman and Sauser, Systems Thinking, xix. 
73 Anderson and Johnson, Systems Thinking Basics, 6. 
74 Anderson and Johnson, Systems Thinking Basics, 6. 
75 David Raviv, “U.S. Pushing Israel to Stop Assassinating Iranian Nuclear Scientists,” CBS News, 
March 1, 2014. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-pushing-israel-to-stop-assassinating-iranian-nuclear-
scientists/.  
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was developed and maintained, and, most importantly, the relationship between these 
components and their influence on each other. The systems approach moves beyond the 
explosion in the streets of Tehran and looks at the entire covert action system to gain a 
more thorough understanding of the interactions at play.  
C. THE COVERT ACTION SYSTEM 
In a system, components interact toward a purpose. The purpose of the covert 
action system is simple: to allow a sponsor to address an issue without acknowledged 
involvement. Covert action components and interactions do not always align in easily 
predictable ways, however, and while the purpose may be clear, the outcome may be far 
from expected. To better understand the ramifications of a covert action strategy, 
policymakers should strive for an understanding of four key aspects of the covert action 
system as shown in Figure 2: the diagram, system effects, feedback, and tradeoffs. The 
system diagram is the foundation of the systems approach and offers a visual 
representation of the system and its interactions. The diagram’s depiction of the whole 
provides a point of departure to help policymakers better anticipate potential system 
effects and emergent behaviors, understand the implications of feedback, and make more 
informed tradeoff decisions.  
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Figure 2.  Covert action systems approach. 
The systems approach to covert action considers the concepts of the system diagram, 
system effects, feedback, and tradeoffs. 
1. The System Diagram 
Figure 3 below represents the “deep structure”76 of the covert action system. This 
diagram is an illustration of the “whole;”77 it goes beyond the single event that is 
typically considered a “covert action” and focuses on the comprehensive, holistic system 
within which the visible actions are nested. The system diagram consists of one external 
factor that initiates the system, the issue, and eight internal components, the decision 
maker’s risk attitude, operational constraints, objectives, type of action and tool, target 
characteristics (both assessed and actual), event, deniability, and effectiveness.  
                                                 
76 Roberts, lecture, May 5, 2014. 
77 Ramo, The Systems Approach, 16. 
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Figure 3.  Covert action system diagram. 
The covert action system diagram depicts the relationships and interactions between the 
key components. 
The system diagram is a cycle that starts with a foreign policy issue energizing the 
system. Facing an issue, the decision maker will decide to address it through either overt 
or covert means, or, as is most often the case, a combination of the two. Once the choice 
is made to proceed with a covert action, the decision maker’s attitude toward risk will 
influence both the operational constraints and the objectives. Both of these components, 
in conjunction with the assessed target characteristics, will determine the type of action 
chosen as well as the specific tool to be employed. The type of action and tool will 
eventually lead to an event; both will also affect the deniability of the overall system. The 
level of deniability, the event, and the actual target characteristics will all factor into the 
level of effectiveness based on the stated objectives. To complete the cycle, the level of 
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effectiveness will then feed back to the decision maker, affecting his attitude toward risk 
when considering covert action strategies in the future. 
Looking at the diagram, one will immediately notice that nodes are not included 
for either a covert unit or an intelligence assessment. This is not to imply that the inputs 
and characteristics of these components fail to affect the whole; on the contrary, their 
impacts are integral to the outcome of the system. Those inputs, however, are captured in 
other components, which allows the diagram to avoid unnecessary complexity. The role 
of the covert unit conducting the action is reflected within the event component while the 
input of the intelligence assessment is reflected in both the decision maker’s risk attitude 
as well as the relationship between the assessed target characteristics and the type of 
action. How the unit is organized, trained, equipped, commanded, controlled, and 
ultimately carries out the mission is less important than the actual outcome of the event. 
Similarly, the collection, analysis, and internal deliberations that go into the intelligence 
assessment are not part of this level of analysis; the focus here is on how that intelligence 
assessment influences both the decision maker and the type of action chosen. In an 
attempt to capture the “deep structure” and “simple elegance”78 that delivers the 
streamlined clarity of the system diagram, the impact of the covert unit and intelligence 
assessment is incorporated in other components.  
a. External System Component 
There will necessarily be factors that play important roles in system behavior, yet 
are external to the artificial borders because “boundaries are in the analyst’s judgment”79 
and purely based on subjective requirements of the study. This system diagram includes 
one externality, the foreign policy issue.  
(1) Issue 
The foreign policy issue acts as the driving force that initiates the system while 
sitting outside the system’s structure. Not all issues lead to covert actions. There are a 
                                                 
78 Roberts, lecture, May 5, 2014. 
79 Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), 174. 
 26 
multitude of issues; only a few of which are candidates for covert operations. The 
decisional process for addressing an issue is simplified in Figure 4 below.80 While the 
graphic makes a sharp distinction between overt and covert approaches, these strategies 
are typically not mutually exclusive. Covert actions are merely subsystems of a larger 
foreign policy system and overt and covert strategies are often integrated to accomplish 
an overall policy objective. It is important to note, too, that while the overt policy options 
are simplified as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, these instruments of 
power also define the covert options. For example, propaganda is a type of informational 
strategy while paramilitary operation, whether conducted by the CIA or the Pentagon, is a 
military campaign. However, for diagrammatical clarity, the range of overt options is not 
exhaustive while the generic “covert action ladder”81 is used to illustrate the covert 
options.  
 
Figure 4.  Foreign policy “issue” decision tree. 
The stakes of the situation will be weighed against the risk and reward of available 
courses of action to help determine the strategy.82 
                                                 
80 John Arquilla, personal communication, May 30, 2014. 
81 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 187. 
82 Arquilla, personal communication, May 30, 2014. 
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Within this simple diagram is a complex decision process weighing the national 
interest at stake against the risks and rewards of addressing that issue through overt or 
covert means. A low stakes issue may not elicit any action, whereas an issue of extremely 
high stakes may lead to a large, overt response. As the stakes increase, the pressing need 
to address the situation also increases. However, heightened stakes do not necessarily 
correlate to increased overt approaches. There are various reasons to pursue a covert 
strategy to address a high stakes problem. Covert action avoids open warfare and can 
circumvent the sensitivities that may arise through overt support of a cause. Avoiding 
open confrontation was the primary reason for the increased use of covert actions during 
the Cold War. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union viewed the stakes of the other’s 
expanding spheres of influence as high enough to warrant a response, yet neither was 
willing to back the other into a corner by openly challenging them through overt means 
and perhaps risking nuclear escalation. Covert actions were, therefore, the weapon of 
choice. Both sides exerted significant influence and even showed signs of cooperation in 
the overt international arena, yet because of the high stakes of allowing the other to gain 
an advantage weighed against the extant risk of a nuclear confrontation, most conflict 
simmered at the covert level.  
Open support to a party can also delegitimize a cause if the sponsor is seen as a 
“puppet master.” Support via more surreptitious means avoids this. For example, U.S. 
backing of the Christian Democratic Party during the Italian national elections in 1948 
was conducted covertly because of the need to conceal the U.S. involvement. The stakes 
of the Italian Communist Party gaining a victory at the polls were deemed high enough to 
necessitate a response; President Truman, however, wanted to avoid the perception of 
manipulating a foreign government’s electoral process. A covert political action was 
therefore considered the best approach to ensure a non-Communist party win in one of 
the first democratic elections of the Cold War.83  
Democratically elected leaders will also consider the domestic advantages of 
employing a covert policy. Because of the secrecy inherent in covert actions, they often 
                                                 
83 James E. Miller, “Taking the Gloves Off: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” 
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appear attractive when objectives conflict with stated policy, or if the proposed action is 
either morally or normatively prohibited. In an environment dominated by realpolitik 
motives with neo-liberal overtones, covert action can be used as a means to accomplish 
objectives that may be considered unsavory.  
Once the decision maker has progressed through this decision process in relation 
to the interest at stake and determines that the best approach to a problem is through 
covert means, the system is initiated.  
b. Internal System Components 
Eight internal components comprise the covert action system. The interplay of 
these components amongst each other and with the external environment determines the 
outcome of the action. 
(1) Decision Maker Risk Attitude 
The decision maker, that individual who is responsible for initiating and, if 
necessary, terminating the covert action system, is the first component within the system. 
The decision maker’s attitude toward risk is instrumental in the operation. Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s prospect theory shows that a decision maker’s attitude 
toward risk will fluctuate between aversion and acceptance based on the stakes of the 
situation and whether he is in the “domain of gains” or the “domain of losses.”84 A 
decision maker will likely be more risk averse if he feels he is in the “domain of gains” 
and likely more risk acceptant if he feels he is in the “domain of losses.” Assessing the 
attitude toward risk is not a value judgment, but rather an acknowledgement that few, if 
any, decisions are based on purely rational cost-benefit analyses. Those making policy 
and political decisions will always incorporate multiple factors into the process, ranging 
from the national interest at stake, to domestic political considerations, to the 
international environment, to personal experience, to a whole host of other elements that 
determine the decision maker’s utility function and ultimately, his approach to covert 
action.  
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The objectives specifically state what is to be accomplished by the system. The 
issue at stake must be transitioned from vague policy goals to precise objectives in order 
to support proper planning and evaluation. The stated objectives help catalyze the system 
from an ambiguous concept into concrete, achievable ends. Objectives and effectiveness 
maintain a direct relationship: as objectives are achieved, effectiveness is reached. 
Establishing measurable goals and linking effectiveness to the accomplishment of those 
goals helps to better determine system status as opposed to the more subjective view of 
basing effectiveness on larger foreign policy success and failure.  
(3) Operational Constraints 
The operational constraints are those rules and restrictions established by the 
decision maker that restrict freedom of action within the system. These constraints can 
range from being very tactical, such as prohibiting U.S. trainers from accompanying the 
Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion on their hunt for Che Guevera in 1967,85 to very strategic, 
such as initially restricting the arms provided to the Afghan mujahedeen to foreign-made 
weapons in the early 1980s.86 The Afghanistan example illustrates, as well, that 
operational constraints can change as conditions change; “direct infusions of advanced 
U.S. military technology into Afghanistan” was authorized with the signing of NSDD-
166 in 1985, significantly escalating the covert war against the Soviet Union.87  
(4) Type of Action / Tool Used 
The type of covert action executed is distinct from the tool used to accomplish 
that action. This thesis will use Lowenthal’s covert action ladder to distinguish between 
the various types of covert action as depicted in Figure 5: propaganda, political activity, 
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economic activity, sabotage, government coup, and paramilitary activity.88 It is 
interesting to note that Lowenthal did not include assassinations in his ladder, perhaps 
because President Ford, through Executive Order 11905 in 1976, banned the use of 
political assassination by U.S. agencies.89 Assassinations, however, have a long and 
storied history that cannot be ignored. To ensure this important variant of covert action is 
not overlooked, assassination will be added as a level between sabotage and government 
coup.  
 
Figure 5.  Lowenthal's covert action ladder.90 
As the level of violence of the action increases, the level of deniability increases. 
Distinct from the type of action, the tool is the means used to accomplish the 
mission. Sabotage, a type of action, can be conducted via multiple tools: special 
operations team, demolition specialists, or cyber warfare experts. Similarly assassination 
can be, and has been, carried out through different techniques: improvised explosive 
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devices, gunmen, or lethal poison. Each type of covert action and associated tool has its 
merits and drawbacks; these should be closely aligned with the stakes at risk as well as 
the desired time of effects as shown in Figure 6. The relationship between stakes and 
instrument is the subject of the first tradeoff within the system and will be addressed 
later. 
 
Figure 6.  Type of action: Stakes versus effects. 
Type of covert action selected should reconcile the stakes at risk with the timeframe of 
desired effects. 
(5) Target Characteristics 
Systems thinking suggests that the placement of the components within the 
system diagram provides insight into the operation of the system; it is therefore no 
coincidence that the target characteristics component sits squarely in the center. As 
depicted, the entire system revolves around the target. Target characteristics incorporate 
both the assessed and actual strengths and vulnerabilities. Assessed characteristics play 
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into the decision of what type of action to conduct, while actual characteristics directly 
affect the outcome of the action. As witnessed throughout history, target assessments and 
reality can differ drastically. During the Bay of Pigs invasion, intelligence estimates 
assessed that 3,000–5,000 Cuban guerrillas were prepared to support the invasion once 
American-backed forces landed. This turned out to be grossly inaccurate and resulted in 
the capture and death of almost the entire paramilitary force.91 The perceived target 
characteristics of the Cuban state contributed to the decision to execute a paramilitary 
operation; but the real vulnerability was far less than expected and instrumental in the 
abject failure of that operation. 
Three types of target characteristics must be considered: physical, political, and 
informational. Physical characteristics are the actual defenses surrounding a target and 
can range from a personal security detail protecting a head of state to an intrusion 
detection system guarding a command post or a firewall securing a computer network. 
The political characteristics relate to the overall stability of the target’s political system. 
If a target is very stable, it will be less susceptible to a political action or a government 
coup. Note that stability and strength are not synonymous. A state may be strong based 
on a single leader with imposing physical defenses yet unstable if the overall political 
system is unable to respond to adverse input from internal or external sources. Finally, 
informational characteristics refer to how susceptible the target is to an information 
operation campaign. As illustrated with Russian cyber attacks in Estonia, Georgia, and 
Ukraine,92 information vulnerabilities can be present in even very stable states and 
provide exploitable opportunities that only a few years ago did not exist.  
(6) Event 
The event component describes the physical result of the action and is nearly 
always visible while, ideally, the sponsor behind the action remains unseen. Events can 
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be very passive such as the broadcast of black propaganda through Radio Free Europe93 
to very aggressive such as the joint U.S.-British campaign to unseat the Albanian 
government in the early days of the Cold War.94 Because of the human tendency to focus 
on event thinking vice systems thinking, the physical outcome is typically the emphasis 
of most covert action studies. In this study, however, it is only one of many factors 
considered.  
(7) Deniability 
By definition, a covert action influences a target while keeping the sponsor’s role 
unacknowledged. Without an attempt at deniability, a covert action would simply be 
another overt, though perhaps still secret, activity. The level of deniability encompasses 
various factors including the strength of the cover story, the control the sponsor exerts on 
the operation, and the type of action conducted. 
Christopher Felix succinctly sums up the importance of the cover story when he 
explains that “as open warfare depends upon weapons, so does the secret war depend 
upon cover.”95 The action itself is typically quite visible and the cover story is used to 
“explain the visible evidences”96 of that action. Even if an action does not initially 
accomplish the objectives, as long as the sponsor’s role remains hidden and plausible 
deniability remains intact, the plan can either be reattempted or shelved with little adverse 
impact. 
Deniability is also affected by the level of control the perpetrator maintains over 
the outcome of the event. As the sponsor’s level of control increases, the ability to deny 
its involvement decreases. In most cases, a sponsor cannot expect to maintain tight 
control of the outcome and remain anonymous. When a sponsor employs a third party in 
the form of a foreign media outlet, a human asset, or a surrogate force, they must be 
aware that those parties may have different motives and exerting excess control on these 
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actors can lead to increased visibility. Covert actions conducted through organic forces, 
whether air breathing or cyber, is one of the few exceptions to the indirect relationship 
between control and deniability. This is not to imply that a sponsor should relinquish all 
control once an action is initiated, only that policymakers must understand that third party 
actors can have differing goals and be aware of the relationship increased control has 
with the overall deniability of an action. 
(8) Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is based on the outcome of the event as it aligns with the system’s 
objectives. If objectives are met, the operation is effective. Linking effectiveness to 
objectives as opposed to linking effectiveness to deniability reiterates the importance of 
treating covert action as a policy tool, not an end in itself. Deniability is a supporting 
condition to achieve objectives in an acceptable manner; not a necessary or sufficient 
condition to effectiveness. The complex relationship between deniability, time, and 
effectiveness is the focus of the second tradeoff in the covert action system and will be 
explored later.  
The overall effectiveness of the system will also influence the decision maker’s 
risk attitude as he addresses future foreign policy issues. Multiple factors influence a 
decision maker’s choice to employ a covert action, not least of which is personal 
experience and knowledge of past covert actions. As Figure 7 illustrates, the effectiveness 
of the present cycle will ultimately shape the decision maker’s assessments of future 
covert action cycles.  
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Figure 7.  Decision maker over time cycle. 
The output of each covert action becomes input into the next covert action cycle, 
influencing the decision maker’s future assessments on the viability of its use. 
2. System Effects 
The system diagram described above establishes a baseline from which further 
analysis can proceed. Without this basic understanding of the key components and 
interactions within the system, it would be much more difficult to understand and 
appreciate the complexities that emerge from the system. Jervis uses the term “system 
effects”97 to describe the resultant emergent properties that are produced by these 
interconnections. While Jervis focuses on system effects within international politics, 
they are also manifest in smaller systems such as covert action. Table 2 outlines Jervis’s 






                                                 




Effect Description Example 
Interactions, 
not “additivity” 
Systemic interactions produce emergent behavior that 
cannot be understood by simply summing the 
components. 




Complex interactions produce delayed results that can 
have far more impact on the long-term system than the 
immediate results of those interactions. 
Paramilitary support 






Interactions between two components will resonate 
with other components both internal and external to 
the system. 
Political activity in 






Unintended consequences are common in systems. 






Table 2.   System effects. 
Jervis’s four system effects and related covert actions.98 
By appreciating how systemic interactions produce outcomes that may diverge 
sharply from neatly designed plans, policymakers can gain a deeper understanding of the 
complex nature of covert actions and perhaps better apply the system to foreign policy 
issues. It may not be possible to control or precisely predict system behavior, but 
policymakers must at least be aware of the existence of system effects in order to make 
informed decisions regarding the merits of a covert action policy.  
3. Feedback 
Understanding feedback is central to understanding system behavior. Feedback is 
the looping concept that distinguishes systems from linear cause-and-effect events.99 As 
Figure 8 illustrates, interactions create feedback, which then returns to the system; 
outputs become inputs that causes the original system to “change, learn, and evolve over 
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time.”100 The system a policymaker deals with today is not the same they will see 
tomorrow. In fact, because of this natural tendency to learn and evolve, George 
Richardson considers “feedback and circular causality…one of the most profound and 
most penetrating fundamentals in all social science.”101 
 
Figure 8.  System feedback. 
System output becomes input in a continuous feedback loop. 
Feedback is “essential to reliable policy analysis”102 because it provides the 
information policymakers need to assess the system’s status, understand how close the 
system is to achieving its purpose, and if required, manipulate the components to achieve 
a different outcome. Without a firm understanding of these interactions and the feedback 
they produce, policymakers cannot hope to properly evaluate the system. But because 
feedback is simply information, mechanisms must be in place to capture system 
feedback. Systems communicate through feedback, but without the means to listen and 
respond, the opportunity to adjust the system’s behavior will be lost.  
4. Tradeoffs  
There are two major tradeoffs within the covert action system: stakes versus 
innovation and deniability over time as it relates to effectiveness. Comprehending the 
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input decision makers have on these tradeoffs and how those inputs impact effectiveness 
can lead to the development of more sound covert action policies. 
a. Stake Versus Innovation 
The first tradeoff, depicted in Figure 9, is that of the national interest at stake 
versus the innovation of the tool applied. Put simply, a state should keep its most 
innovative tools in reserve until a threat presents itself that warrants revealing that tool 
because once used, a tool’s effectiveness begins to drop as technology is diffused and 
adversaries develop countermeasures. The stakes versus innovation decision will not 
always be a straight, direct relationship as there may be situations when a low stakes 
issue will be addressed with a highly innovative tool. However, as a generality, highly 
innovative tools should be reserved for high stakes. 
 
Figure 9.  Tradeoff #1: Stakes versus degree of innovativeness of the tool. 
Tradeoff depicting the need to align the innovation of the tool with the level of the stakes. 
It is important for decision makers to acknowledge this tradeoff exists even if 
there is no correct answer. Electing to withhold the use of an innovative tool in 
anticipation of a situation where stakes merit its use may provide the target ample time to 
develop defenses against it through standard technological research and development. On 
the other hand, deploying an innovative tool against a stake that does not meet a self-
imposed threshold may be a waste of a capability. Decision makers face an age-old 
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dilemma: withhold a capability in anticipation of future dangers or burn a tool in order to 
neutralize a present day threat. This tradeoff does not exist solely in the realm of covert 
action, but with the recent technological advances in cyber technology, it is becoming 
more imperative for decision makers to consider the ramifications of this tradeoff before 
employing new, innovative technology in a covert capacity.  
b. Deniability Over Time 
The second tradeoff in the covert action system, depicted in Figure 10, is the 
interaction between deniability and time as it relates to effectiveness. Covert action 
effectiveness is determined by objectives met, not by whether an action remains 
unattributed or unacknowledged. Deniability, however, is a critical supporting factor to 
effectiveness. The more deniable an operation, the longer a sponsor’s role will remain 
hidden, the more time available to achieve the objectives covertly.  
A decision is required when the action is nearing exposure. When exposure 
becomes imminent, decision makers should decide whether to shut down the operation, 
proceed in an “overt-covert” manner, or transition to an overt action. This decision 
should be based off an analysis of the objectives at stake weighed against the expected 
fallout of exposure. Again, there is no correct answer to this tradeoff. Some stakes will be 
deemed high enough to warrant proceeding under “overt-covert” or purely overt 
conditions whereas some may be low enough to justify aborting the action. Decision 
makers must simply be prepared to address this decision when the time comes by 
understanding the future repercussions their choices will have.  
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Figure 10.  Tradeoff #2: Deniability over time as it relates to effectiveness. 
Tradeoff depicting the relationship between deniability, effectiveness, and time. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The systems approach is “an intellectual discipline…to attack complex, large-
scale problems in an objective, logical, complete, and thoroughly professional way.”103 
Covert action is nothing if not complex and viewing this dynamic policy instrument 
through a systems lens may allow for better assessments of the advantages and 
disadvantages of a covert policy. The following chapters will examine a range of 
historical vignettes to highlight the systems approach concepts of the system diagram, 
system effects, feedback, and tradeoffs in order to illustrate how this analytic method can 
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III. CASES FROM THE PRE-WORLD WAR II PERIOD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Covert action came into practice long before the end of World War Two and the 
beginning of the more nuanced hostilities that defined the Cold War. In fact, the United 
States has a rich history of covert operations dating as far back as General Washington’s 
arms procurement efforts via the Secret Committee in 1775.104 Every president since has 
used some form of covert response to address a foreign policy concern and many other 
countries have engaged in covert action over long periods. While the issues, tools, and 
approaches have evolved over the past 200 years, the fundamental core of the covert 
action system has remained largely unchanged. 
This chapter will first provide a brief overview of covert action during the pre-
World War Two timeframe. The system diagram introduced in Chapter II will then be 
used to examine four covert actions representative of those that were executed during this 
early period: President Jefferson’s sponsorship of a coup to overthrow the pasha of 
Tripoli during the Barbary War, President Lincoln’s propaganda campaign to dissuade 
European support for the Confederacy during the American Civil War, President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s paramilitary operation to establish the state of Panama thus 
enabling the construction of the Panama Canal, and Vladimir Lenin’s political activities 
to destroy the counterrevolutionary forces after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Each 
vignette will highlight specific interactions within the system to demonstrate how the 
diagram can enhance understanding by providing a visual depiction of the system’s 
complexity. 
B. PRE-WORLD WAR TWO OVERVIEW 
With the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the American Revolution came to 
an end. However, the challenges this new nation would face were only just beginning. 
From 1783 to the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, America’s political leaders would 
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use covert action to cope with three main issues: economic and military insecurity, 
geographic growth, and eventually, the quest for international prestige.  
Security was the first hurdle the newly formed government faced. The departure 
of British troops from American soil left the United States with a glaring existential 
problem: how, with limited economic and military strength, was the U.S. to protect itself 
from internal and external threats? The executive branch turned to covert action as one 
avenue to confront this dilemma. Perhaps the best-known early use of covert action in 
response to a security threat during this time was the aborted attempt to overthrow the 
Tripoli government in retaliation for its harassment of U.S. merchant shipping. Covert 
actions to enhance security were not limited solely to overseas adversaries, though; they 
were also used to counter the dangers posed by the native tribes along the frontier during 
America’s expansion westward. While these internal operations accounted for little more 
than bribing tribal elders, the use of a “cutout” to execute the bribe, thus ensuring 
plausible deniability, is an early example of a covert economic activity.105 By far the 
most extreme security threat the nation faced during this period was the American Civil 
War. No doubt the battles at Shiloh, Antietam, Gettysburg, and Vicksburg were 
instrumental factors in the Union’s victory, but the secret war Lincoln waged in Europe 
for the support of France and Britain was crucial to the outcome as well. Through a 
covert campaign of sabotage, propaganda, and economic activities, Lincoln denied the 
Confederacy the support it so desperately needed.  
The nation’s basic need for security ran in tandem with a desire for geographic 
growth. The term “Manifest Destiny” would not be coined until 1845,106 yet westward 
and southern expansion was firmly embedded in the psyche of the American citizen since 
the early days of the country. Henry Adams believed that Jefferson’s “greed for land 
equaled that of any settler on the border”107 and he went to great lengths to expand the 
territory through both overt and covert means. Jefferson’s territorial acquisition was 
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followed by President Madison’s attempt in 1810 and 1811 to acquire West and East 
Florida from Spain by exploiting existing tensions in order to ignite a rebellion, thereby 
justifying American intervention and annexation. This tactic succeeded in West Florida 
but failed in East Florida (incidentally, a rebellion incited to justify intervention served as 
the basis of President Theodore Roosevelt’s covert action to create the state of Panama 
almost a century later). Decades after Madison, President Grant, driven by both economic 
and military interests, began a campaign to seize the Hawaiian Islands. President 
Harrison would continue this process and sponsor a coup to annex what would eventually 
become the fiftieth U.S. state.108  
During this period, there were few moral qualms about using covert action to 
target American citizens. President Tyler, in 1841, pursued a protracted propaganda and 
disinformation campaign against the residents of Maine to settle a dispute with Britain 
over the northern border, going so far as to fabricate a “lost map” that had been recently 
“discovered” amongst Benjamin Franklin’s papers.109 This forged document convinced 
the residents to accept a compromise before the British also “discovered” the artifact and 
laid greater claim to the northern border. From Maine to Florida to Hawaii, the U.S. 
borders today are due in part to the successful use of covert operations.  
The desire to establish the U.S. as a world power was another reason to resort to 
covert actions. Even before the official announcement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, 
the U.S. was focused on displacing European influence in the western hemisphere. As 
early as 1810, President Madison authorized an “agent of influence” to “create and direct 
political movements…pledged to the adoption of the American model of government and 
hostile to European interests”110 in various countries in Central and South America. 
Despite the lack of economic and military strength, the U.S. was still able to enforce the 
“hands off” policy that the Monroe Doctrine established through these “agents of 
influence.” This quest for international prestige was realized with President Theodore 
                                                 
108 Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New 
York: Time Books, 2006), 13. 
109 Carter, Covert Operations, 75. 
110 Knott, Secret and Sanctioned, 108. 
 44 
Roosevelt’s successful completion of a trans-isthmian canal in 1913, an endeavor of 
which many European nations had dreamed. “The greatest engineering work of all 
time”111 would have been further delayed were it not for the paramilitary operation that 
established the state of Panama.  
This study focuses heavily on the American experience with covert action, yet 
one cannot overlook the historic international use of this policy tool. If spying is the 
world’s second oldest profession, covert action was likely one of the spy’s first missions. 
Even Christianity’s Book of Genesis opens with perhaps the best known covert action in 
the Western world: a snake, with the intent to hide its true origin, convinces Eve to eat 
the forbidden fruit, thus condemning mankind to a life outside the Garden of Eden. More 
pertinent to this discussion, many of the great powers participated in covert operations 
prior to World War Two to further their national causes. During the French occupation of 
Prussia in the early nineteenth century, the British Foreign Office heavily subsidized 
covert operations against Napoleon in the form of propaganda and paramilitary 
support.112 Underground “fraternal orders” were supported to help “rid Germany of 
Napoleon and his ‘Latin hordes.’”113 These “secret societies” were beginning to emerge 
throughout Europe to support political progress and independent rule. Sects such as the 
Carbonari of Italy, the Associated Patriots of France, and the Communeros of Spain114 
were secretly dedicated to “unity, liberty, and independence”115 and considered a 
“menace”116 to the existing ruling structure. Actions ranging from innocuous propaganda 
efforts directed against the Spanish regime to fomenting radical revolution in Paris were, 
as Thomas Frost claimed in 1876, “reckoned among the forces which have produced the 
                                                 
111 David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870–1914 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), 590. 
112 Otto W. Johnson, “British Espionage and Prussian Politics in the Age of Napoleon,” Intelligence 
and National Security 2, no. 2 (1987): 238. 
113 Johnson, “British Espionage and Prussian Politics in the Age of Napoleon,” 241. 
114 See Thomas Frost, The Secret Societies of the European Revolution, 1776–1876 (London: Tinsley 
Brothers, 1876). 
115 R. John Rath, “The Carbonari: Their Origins, Initiation Rites, and Aims,” The American Historical 
Review 69, no. 2 (January 1964): 370. 
116 Rath, “The Carbonari,” 366. 
 45 
European revolution.”117 Years later, after the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia would begin 
establishing “trade organizations” in major international cities to influence local 
governments and populations. In fact, one of the most successful Russian covert 
campaigns, Operation Trust, was based on a front organization known as the Monarchist 
Organization of Central Russia that passed itself off as an anti-Bolshevik underground 
force to target the White Russian émigré groups.118  
Covert action was not restricted to adversaries countering adversaries. The British 
conducted a massive covert campaign against the U.S. in the immediate build-up to 
World War Two through the British Security Cooperation (BSC). The BSC, based out of 
the Rockefeller Center in New York City was established to develop a cooperative 
relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); covertly, its mission was to 
“do all that was not being done and could not be done by overt means to assure sufficient 
aid for Britain and eventually to bring America into the war.”119 The BSC undertook 
what some consider “the largest covert operation in UK history,”120 by “attacking the 
isolationism and fostering interventionism” in the American population.121 Anti-German, 
anti-Japanese, and pro-British articles were published through such pillars of the 
American media as The New York Times, The New York Herald, The Washington Post, 
and The Baltimore Sun. Pro-British and pro-interventionist political organizations were 
also subsidized and isolationist groups such as America First Committee became the 
target of directed counter-propaganda and low-scale sabotage campaigns. A short wave 
radio station with a large international audience, WRUL, unwittingly became a conduit of 
BSC propaganda when a network of cut-outs and intermediaries suddenly took great 
interest in their content.122 The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 made BSC’s 
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campaign to shift American attitudes toward intervention moot and the propaganda 
efforts were largely abandoned to be replaced by more open cooperation and partnership 
with the nascent U.S. intelligence entities to support the overall Allied war effort.  
From time immemorial, states have resorted to covert operations to influence 
adversaries and allies alike. Regardless of the specific state which conducted the covert 
action or the particular time period in which it was executed, it can be seen that the core 
of the covert action system diagram has remained essentially unchanged. Generally 
speaking, pre-World War Two covert operations were much more ad-hoc and informal 
with significantly less oversight than those conducted today, however, the basic systemic 
logic that defines covert action has remained much the same. Tools, techniques, practices, 
and statutes have all evolved over the years, but the underlying structure has changed 
little.  
C. JEFFERSON AND THE TRIPOLI COUP 
President Jefferson’s attempt to overthrow the government of Tripoli, later 
aborted, to address one of the nation’s first international crises is analyzed below. The 
system diagram depicting this covert action is shown in Figure 11. 
1. The System 
Immediately upon taking office President Jefferson was faced with a major 
foreign policy crisis, harassment of U.S. merchant shipping by the Barbary States. The 
purpose in responding to the Barbary aggression was two-sided: protect the fledgling 
merchant fleet and establish the precedent that American assets would be defended. 
Jefferson was determined to fight an inexpensive war—the only kind he could afford—
and therefore resorted to tactics ranging from diplomatic measures to naval action to the 
sponsorship of a coup.123 It was determined that the best option to secure shipping 
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through the Mediterranean was to “pressure the reigning sovereign to sue for peace on 
American terms.”124 To that end, a proposal was hatched to overthrow the pasha of 
Tripoli with American support through “artillery, arms, ammunition, some marines, and 
$40,000.”125 It is unclear exactly what operational constraints were established, however, 
it is worth noting that while the “overall effort was sanctioned at the highest levels, 
certain operational details were conveniently left to the discretion of those in the field”126 
leading one to believe that, in fact, few operational constraints were in place. Through 
Secretary of State James Madison, the American consul in Tunis William Eaton was 
directed to contact the pasha of Tripoli’s brother, Hamet Karamanli, to discuss a potential 
covert partnership with the Americans. Eaton’s verbal orders were to convince Hamet to 
“cooperate with the naval force…against the usurper, his brother and for re-establishing 
him in the regency of Tripoli.”127 Eaton’s meeting with Hamet coupled with the 
intelligence he collected in the region led him to assess that “Bahaw Yusuf had become 
such a hated tyrant that many thousands of his subjects were only waiting for an excuse 
to rally to Hamet.”128  
Based on Eaton’s assessment of the situation, as well as the continuing 
harassment of merchant shipping, Jefferson authorized a small U.S. contingent to support 
a coup in the spring of 1804. Eaton contacted Hamet in Egypt and with a force of nearly 
400 of Hamet’s supporters accompanied by a small contingent of U.S. Marines129 began 
a march from Egypt to Tripoli with the intent to overthrow the pasha. During this march 
across the desert, the pasha faced increasing pressure and quickly sued for peace. With 
the cessation of hostilities, the U.S. extracted Eaton, Hamet, and the Marines while the 
remaining men were left to fend for themselves. The Arab force was to give the 
appearance of an indigenous uprising, yet it was a poorly kept secret that the U.S. had 
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sponsored the action. Regardless of the low level of deniability, the operation still 
achieved the desired result: compelling the pasha to sue for peace.  
The “success” of this operation, as it relates to foreign policy, is debatable. The 
final agreement with Tripoli “set off a firestorm in Congress” and led to “public outcry 
against selling out to Tripoli.”130 When the treaty was ratified by Congress in April of 
1806, “it proved to be one of the most unpopular treaties in U.S. history.”131 It should be 
noted that Jefferson’s treaty with the pasha of Tripoli did not solve the Barbary pirate 
issue, but it did provide some reprieve. While the success of the policy may still be in 
question, the effectiveness of the covert action is undeniable. Hamet’s march across 
Africa convinced the pasha to sue for peace—the original objective. This first U.S. 
intervention in the internal affairs of a foreign nation was highly effective in the near 
term and arguably laid a foundation for the nation’s future relationship with covert action. 
                                                 
130 Whipple, To the Shores of Tripoli, 264.  
131 Whipple, To the Shores of Tripoli, 264. 
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Figure 11.  System diagram of Tripoli coup. 
The system diagram depicts President Jefferson's coup to overthrow the pasha of Tripoli. 
The components in green will be the focus of the below analysis. 
2. Highlights of the System 
 Overlaying the system diagram on the covert action allows one to better grasp the 
internal relationships between components. The following interactions are the focus of 
the below analysis: 1) the relationship between the objectives, target characteristics, type 
of action, and effectiveness; and 2) the interaction between the current cycle and future 
decision makers. This example also highlights the fact that most covert actions are rarely 
stand-alone affairs; instead they are typically nested within larger foreign policy 
initiatives. 
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A decision maker sets the “objectives” which determines the “type and tool” of 
the action. It is critical to note that the primary objective of this operation was not to 
dethrone the sitting pasha of Tripoli. Instead, it was clearly stated by Jefferson that the 
desired end state was peace and protection of the shipping assets “with or without”132 a 
regime change. Removing the pasha was a means to Jefferson’s desire for peace, not an 
end in itself. Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith reiterated this objective in a letter to a 
subordinate tasked to negotiate with Tripoli, “in adjusting the terms of Peace with the 
Dey of Tripoli, whatever regard may be had to the situation of his Brother, it is not to be 
considered by you of sufficient magnitude to prevent or even to retard a final settlement 
with the Dey.”133 Because the goal was to force the pasha to sue for peace, there was 
little hesitation to use Hamet as a mere “instrument”134 of U.S. foreign policy. It is 
unclear whether this bargaining tactic was communicated to Hamet, but, moral and 
ethical considerations aside, it provided U.S. agents great flexibility.  
The assessment of the “target characteristics” also helped determined the “type 
and tool.” The “type and tool” led to the “event,” which, in conjunction with the “actual 
target characteristics” led to “effectiveness.” Eaton’s assessment that the physical 
security and political instability of Tripoli made it ripe for a coup was instrumental in the 
decision to authorize this covert action. He reported that the Tripolitans were tired of war 
and “would rise en masse to receive” their “rightful sovereign.”135 This assessment 
convinced Jefferson that sponsoring a coup would either replace a tiresome adversary 
with an ally or frighten him into signing a peace treaty; regardless of which of the two 
outcomes occurred, the objective would be met. Hamet’s march across the desert 
concerned the pasha enough that he signed a treaty in June 1805, promising protection of 
the U.S. merchant fleet. While the coup itself was aborted, the overall operation was 
effective and shipping was, at least initially, protected through a signed treaty with 
                                                 
132 The Jefferson Monticello Research and Collections, “The First Barbary War,” Thomas Jefferson 
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Tripoli.136 This illustrates the obvious, yet often ignored, principle that a covert action is 
a tool and should not be seen as an end in itself. Eaton, as the tactician on the ground, was 
understandably upset when the mission was cancelled and his men were pulled out. It 
took a strategic view removed from the emotion of the operation to understand the coup 
was simply a supporting operation to achieve the objective.  
The second relationship that this vignette illustrates is the interaction between the 
“effectiveness” of the current cycle and “future decision makers.” It was Jefferson who 
truly established the precedent of covert action as a means to support the nation’s 
interests. It is a wasted academic exercise to debate how history may have changed had 
this first attempt at meddling in the domestic affairs of another nation failed, but it is 
evident that the effectiveness influenced not only Jefferson but later administrations as 
well. Subsequent presidents were emboldened by Jefferson’s use of covert activities and 
it was only a few years later when Madison sought to acquire both West and East Florida 
through covert means. For over two centuries, the U.S. has been secretly interfering in the 
affairs of other states, and it all started with Jefferson in Tripoli. 
Finally, this example highlights the notion that covert actions are often 
subsystems of larger foreign policy meta-systems. They are rarely successful on their 
own and should be used as a part of a comprehensive approach to an issue. Jefferson did 
not rely solely on Eaton and Hamet to persuade the pasha to negotiate a treaty, instead, 
the coup was one of many initiatives underway to protect U.S. shipping. A very overt war 
was being waged on the Mediterranean with the U.S. navy blockading the Tripoli ports 
while planning for a full-scale ground invasion. It is impossible to determine whether the 
pasha would have accepted the American terms if not for the U.S. frigates in his waters, 
however, the fact remains that the administration did not take that chance. Instead, the 
coup was conducted in tandem with other forms of influence to persuade the government 
of Tripoli to succumb.  
                                                 
136 Like many examples that will be cited in this study, the Tripoli coup reiterates the distinction 
between effective and successful. The coup initiated and then aborted by Jefferson was effective because it 
achieved the stated objectives – a signed treaty. However, the treaty was soon violated and the U.S. navy 
had to return to the region to protect American interests through an overt action. Simply because a covert 
action is effective in the near term does not constitute overall policy success. 
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This first major covert action conducted by the U.S. highlights a few of the 
interactions within the system. The objectives established by Jefferson in conjunction 
with the assessed target characteristics of the region led him to authorize a coup. The 
approval of the coup led Eaton, Hamet, and a sizeable force to march on Tripoli with the 
intent of overthrowing the government. That action, embedded with other tools of 
influence, caused the pasha to sue for peace, effectively achieving the original objectives. 
Most importantly, the effectiveness of this action set the precedent for the use of covert 
action by future administrations. 
D. LINCOLN AND THE THREAT OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION IN 
THE CIVIL WAR 
President Lincoln’s use propaganda to discourage European intervention on 
behalf of the Confederacy during the American Civil War is the subject of the below 
analysis. The system diagram depicting this covert action is shown in Figure 12. 
1. The System 
The scope of this thesis covers covert action during times of peace, so it may 
appear contradictory to include an example that was conducted by the Union during the 
American Civil War—one of the bloodiest wars on record. This covert action was not 
executed on American soil but instead in the heart of Europe and therefore still falls 
within the “peacetime” scope of this study. As the Civil War raged in America, President 
Lincoln understood the potential impact of European intervention on the outcome and 
through a covert campaign took the offensive to counter that possibility. The issue at 
stake was nothing less than European public, diplomatic, economic, and materiel support, 
support that could potentially shift the course of the war in favor of the Confederacy. 
Lincoln entrusted his Secretary of State William Seward to engage his ambassador to 
Belgium, Henry Shelton Sanford, to help in this effort. Lincoln’s guidance to Seward and 
Sanford was clear but not specific, “to nullify the efforts of their Confederate 
counterparts.”137 Few operational constraints were placed on Sanford; Seward, who 
echoed Lincoln, wrote to his ambassador that “you need not consider yourself as being 
                                                 
137 Abraham Lincoln, as cited in Knott, Secret and Sanctioned, 141. 
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restricted…from repairing at any to points in Europe which you may deem your presence 
necessary, or likely to conduce to the public interest.”138  
To this end, Sanford directed multiple covert activities throughout Europe, 
ranging from economic activities that secretly purchased supplies needed by the 
Confederacy139 to sabotage missions that offered to scuttle Confederate ships before 
leaving England to simply bribing ship captains to sail Confederacy-destined supplies to 
Union ports.140 Even amid such a varied covert campaign, Sanford’s propaganda 
program was seen as one of his most ambitious efforts.141 The program targeted foreign 
newspapers by “subsidizing” key media outlets.142 The level of both deniability and 
effectiveness of this operation is evident in a letter sent by a Confederate agent operating 
in Europe who wrote “L’independence belge (a Belgium newspaper)…is under a peculiar 
influence in its violent hostility to the Confederate States.”143 Support in the European 
media was swinging to the Union, yet it was not entirely clear why. The success of these 
early covert efforts subsequently led Sanford to plan and execute more complex actions, 
including the use of American clergymen to sway their European counterparts, covert 
agents to inspire “spontaneous”144 rallies at British trade union gatherings, and other 
operations that wreaked havoc on the South’s attempt to curry favor in Europe.  
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Figure 12.  System diagram of Union propaganda. 
The system diagram depicts President Lincoln's covert propaganda efforts to deny 
European support for the Confederacy. The components in green will be the focus of the 
below analysis. 
2. Highlights of the System 
This vignette highlights the relationship between the decision maker, the 
objectives, the operational constraints, and the type of action. The “decision maker” sets 
the “objectives” and establishes the “operational constraints,” both of which influence the 
“type and tool.” During the Civil War, the initial structure of American intelligence was 
in development and covert actions began to transition from informal, ad hoc operations to 
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more formal affairs,145 yet the president was still not firmly entrenched in the decision-
making process. Lincoln made it clear that he wanted to deny support to the Confederacy 
and prevent access to European markets, but it does not appear he participated in the 
detailed decisions of how that would be accomplished. Once Lincoln established the 
larger objectives, Sanford was given the authorization, flexibility, and resources to 
determine on his own how to move forward. This is not to imply that Lincoln was 
unaware or unwitting in the covert campaign, only that no formal process was yet 
established to necessitate his full involvement. He established the strategic goal and then 
removed himself from the system, at which point Sanford became the “decision maker,” 
determining what type of covert actions to conduct and subsequently influenced by the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of those events when planning future operations.  
In Lincoln’s era, the “decision maker” could be delegated down to much lower 
levels as seen with Sanford’s control of the covert campaign in Europe. Due to various 
American covert action scandals over the years, both Congress and the executive branch 
have established very strict lines of reporting. This vignette illustrates, however, that the 
system diagram is general enough to be applied beyond current U.S. processes and can 
provide insight when less formal planning and execution mechanisms are used. Historical 
and international use of covert action will not mirror the current U.S. approach, but the 
system diagram can still assist in visualizing even less formal covert action processes. 
E. ROOSEVELT AND THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF PANAMA  
President Theodore Roosevelt’s paramilitary operation to create the state of 
Panama and garner a favorable canal treaty is analyzed below. The system diagram 
depicting this covert action is shown in Figure 13. 
1. The System 
President Roosevelt’s foreign policy revolved around two complementary goals: 
“gaining recognition of the U.S. as a world power and the acceptance by the other world 
                                                 
145 John D. Stempel, “Covert Action and Diplomacy,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 20, no. 1 (2007): 123. 
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powers of the essential premise of the Monroe Doctrine.”146 The construction of the 
Panama Canal, something that had been dreamed of since Balboa crossed the isthmus in 
1513, nested neatly within these two aims. When negotiations with Colombia broke down 
over the terms of a canal treaty, Roosevelt saw two alternatives, “(1) to take up 
Nicaragua; or (2) in some shape or way to interfere when it becomes necessary so as to 
secure the Panama route without further dealing with the foolish and homicidal 
corruptionists in Bogota.”147 For multiple reasons including a strong lobbying effort by 
private businesses, Roosevelt chose the second alternative and began to consider a covert 
action to support rebels within the Colombian province of Panama. The objective was 
relatively simple: support the creation of an independent state of Panama in exchange for 
a canal treaty beneficial to the U.S. Again, as has been shown to be typical of this period, 
it is unclear what, if any, formal operational constraints were established. Two officials 
were dispatched to Panama to assess the stability of the region and reported back that the 
“conditions were ripe for rebellion” and the rebel group’s “cadre was well organized and 
positioned to quickly seize control of the province once hostilities started.”148 This 
assessment led Roosevelt to authorize a paramilitary operation in support of an existing 
Panamanian revolutionary group. $100,000 was deposited into a bank account belonging 
to the group and promises were made to provide American diplomatic and military 
support in the event of an uprising.149  
On November 3, 1903, shortly before conflict broke out, the U.S. deployed three 
gunboats to the area to “prevent the landing of any armed force ‘either government or 
insurgent’” and to ensure “free and uninterrupted transit on the railroad.” 150 This thinly 
veiled attempt at neutrality had the desired effect, the menacing shadow of U.S. gunboats 
and active involvement of U.S. naval officers prevented Colombian reinforcements from 
either landing ashore or transiting from Colon to Panama City. The junta declared 
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themselves a sovereign state and within 48 hours the U.S. extended diplomatic 
recognition. Roosevelt was severely criticized domestically yet adamantly denied any 
involvement with the rebel group, maintaining that “no one connected with this 
Government had any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the 
Isthmus of Panama.”151 Despite Roosevelt’s assertions, the Attorney General still 
produced an ex post facto legal argument to justify his actions but when Panama offered a 
treaty so overwhelmingly beneficial to U.S. interests, Congress quickly dropped its 
opposition.152 The Hay—Bunau-Varilla Treaty was ratified on February 23, 1904 and 10 
years later, after a massive feat of engineering, the first ship passed from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific Ocean through the Panama Canal.  
                                                 
151 Roosevelt eventually admitted U.S. government involvement years later when, in a speech at 
University of California-Berkeley, he declared that “the Panama Canal would not have been started if I had 
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Congress not to debate the canal, but to debate me.” Roosevelt, as cited in McCullough, The Path Between 
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Figure 13.  System diagram of Panamanian paramilitary support. 
The system diagram depicts President Theodore Roosevelt's paramilitary operation to 
create the state of Panama. The components in green will be the focus of the below 
analysis. 
2. Highlights of the System 
Roosevelt’s paramilitary operation illustrates the relationship between the event, 
deniability, and effectiveness. The level of “deniability” as well as “effectiveness” are 
both influenced by the outcome of the “event.” An “event” will determine the 
“effectiveness” of the action; the event’s signature will also affect “deniability.” Recall 
that the effectiveness of covert actions should be measured by the degree to which the 
event meets the objectives, not by the level of deniability maintained. Delinking 
deniability from effectiveness begs the question of the importance of deniability. 
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Churchman recommends that a systems study focus only on “those components whose 
measures of performance are truly related to the measure of performance of the overall 
system.”153 If deniability does not directly impact effectiveness, why consider it a key 
component in the covert action system? Put simply, deniability buys time for an operation 
to covertly achieve the objectives; when deniability is lost, a decision must be made 
quickly on whether the stakes are worth the expected fallout of exposure. Deniability may 
not be directly related to effectiveness, it is, however, a critical component to the 
dynamic interactions that determine effectiveness.  
Roosevelt viewed the creation of Panama as a high-stakes issue. Here was an 
opportunity to achieve two of his foreign policy goals at once: recognition of the U.S. as 
a world power and supplanting European influence in the region. There was not a great 
need for a high level of deniability; Roosevelt simply needed to buy enough time to allow 
the rebels to seize control of the province at which point the U.S. could justify overt 
intervention, extend diplomatic recognition and in return, garner a favorable canal treaty. 
Deniability was limited by two primary factors: previous official statements and the level 
of control exerted on the outcome. Roosevelt had made it clear that he wanted to finalize 
a canal treaty during his presidential term, declaring to Congress that “no single great 
material work which remains to be undertaken on this continent is of such consequence to 
the American people.”154 He also exerted a significant level of control over the event by 
immediately deploying gunboats to the port which ensured that Colombian forces would 
be unable to quell the rebellion. However, the low level of deniability did not negatively 
impact the effectiveness of the operation; again, Roosevelt only needed to maintain 
deniability long enough and to such a degree as to allow the rebels to declare 
independence at which point he could justify U.S. overt intervention to “prevent the 
landing of any armed force ‘either government or insurgent’”155 in a show of neutrality. 
The rebellion and diplomatic recognition eventually led to the accomplishment of the 
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objectives, a favorable canal treaty, and therefore an effective action despite the limited 
deniability. 
F. LENIN AND HIS EFFORT TO DESTROY THE ANTI-BOLSHEVIKS 
Vladimir Lenin’s use of covert political activities to shore up support for his 
Bolshevik government and address the threat of counterrevolutionary forces is looked at 
in closer detail below. The system diagram depicting this covert action is shown in Figure 
14. 
1. The System 
In March 1917, Russian Czar Nicholas II was deposed and the long-ruling 
Romanov dynasty came to an end. Following the news of the overthrow, Vladimir Lenin, 
leader of the Bolshevik party in exile in Switzerland at the time, was anxious to return to 
Russia to lead the nascent revolution. Between Lenin and St. Petersburg, however, were 
the battlefields of World War I and Russia’s “hated enemy,”156 Germany. The German 
government, in a bitter struggle with Russia on its Eastern Front, saw Lenin as an 
opportunity. By throwing its full support behind the “extremist revolutionary movement” 
and secretly assisting Lenin’s return, it could “create the greatest possible degree of chaos 
in Russia.”157 With this aim in mind, an agreement was reached to allow a diplomatically 
“sealed train” to travel through Germany carrying Lenin and his fellow revolutionists. 
For the Germans, this was an opportunity to “export its most devastating weapon of war 
to St Petersburg: Lenin in a sealed train;”158 for Lenin, this offered the plausible 
deniability he needed so as not to be considered a “traitor” for consorting with the 
German enemy. Lenin returned to Russia in April to a hero’s welcome but fled in July 
when details of his “secret deal” with the Germans were released by the provisional 
government.159  
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Lenin, in exile again, called for an armed revolution to remove the “liberal and 
bourgeois”160 provisional government. He returned in October and took control in a 
relatively bloodless coup.161 As the Bolsheviks were attempting to consolidate power, a 
civil war erupted between the new Russian state and anti-Bolshevik forces. After intense 
fighting, the counterrevolutionary forces were defeated in 1920 and most czarist and 
provisional government supporters had fled to Western Europe. The world’s first Marxist 
state was officially founded. 
Soon after the initial overthrow of the provisional government and well before the 
outbreak of the civil war, Lenin understood the dangers posed by anti-Bolshevik forces 
and a counterrevolutionary movement. To address these threats, he established the 
Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage, known simply as 
the Cheka.162 The Cheka’s mission was, as its founding father and “patron saint of the 
KGB”163 Felix Dzerzhinsky declared, “to save the revolution” and to do so “we must first 
destroy the counter-revolutionaries.”164 An estimated one to two million Russians had 
fled during the two-year civil war and there was a rising concern of a growing dissident 
movement in Western Europe.165 To the Bolsheviks, “the émigrés appeared to be 
organized for some kind of effective action, but in reality they floundered.”166 Reality, 
however, did not assuage Lenin’s fears and the Checka “gave first priority to an attempt 
to penetrate all White Russian groups in and outside of Russia.”167  
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To this end, the Cheka established The Trust. Known today as Operation Trust,168 
this covert political activity became “the most successful Soviet intelligence operation of 
the 1920s.”169 The Trust was formed under the guise of a highly secretive, anti-Bolshevik 
underground named the Monarchist Association of Central Russia whose “members” (in 
reality Cheka, and later, GPU agents) would regularly travel from Russia to Western 
Europe to make contact with White Russian leadership. The Trust was to supposedly 
garner support for the eventual overthrow of the Bolshevik government; its actual 
mission was to ferret out internal and external counterrevolutionary forces. Trust 
succeeded by making contact with émigré leadership, reporting on their activities, and in 
some cases, convincing them to return to Russia to meet with “local underground forces.” 
Once they were across the border, state security would either arrest them or conduct 
surveillance if they were suspected of having legitimate counterrevolutionary contacts 
within Russia. Trust not only completely infiltrated many White Russian organizations 
but also penetrated the foreign intelligence services of Britain, France, Poland, and 
Finland.170 It was such a well-run dezinformatsiya campaign that even the British “master 
spy,” Sidney Reilly, fell victim to its deception and was arrested and executed through a 
Trust operation.171  
A similar covert political action, Operation Syndicate,172 was executed around the 
same time and based on the Trust design. Boris Savinkov was the target of Syndicate, a 
“former Social Revolutionary terrorist” whom Winston Churchill once referred to as a 
man who “gave more, dared more, and suffered more for the Russian people” than few 
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others.173 Savinkov had founded “The People’s Association for the Defense of the 
Motherland and Freedom” in Poland and was thus considered a high priority to 
“neutralize.”174 A bogus Liberal Democratic underground organization was formed and 
its members, again Cheka agents, reached out to Savinkov. Playing to his ego, they 
convinced him to return to Russia with the plea that their organization needed his 
leadership “lest the whole movement fall apart.”175 Savinkov fell for the ruse and, once 
in Russian territory, he was arrested, forced to confess, and eventually executed.176  
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Figure 14.  System diagram of anti-Bolshevik political activity. 
The system diagram depicts Vladimir Lenin's covert political activities to defeat the 
counterrevolutionary forces. This diagram illustrates the generalizability of the system 
diagram beyond American examples. 
2. Highlights of the System 
As the below analysis will show, this example of early Soviet use of covert action 
illustrates the universality of the system diagram. Not only does the diagram provide 
insight into American covert operations but international experiences as well. The 
components within the diagram are intentionally generic to allow the diagram to be 
applied to both U.S. and foreign operations.  
The primary issue for Lenin’s newly founded Marxist state was internal and 
external security from counterrevolutionaries. The Cheka, and later the GPU, was 
designated as the decision maker and given the freedom to address this issue. The 
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objective was to infiltrate the White Russian émigré population. To accomplish this, the 
Cheka determined that the type and tool most appropriate would be a covert political 
activity to organize “pretend White Guard associations.”177 Few operational constraints 
were established and the agents were given significant leeway when interacting with the 
White Russians through these organizations. The target, the counterrevolutionaries, was 
assessed as disorganized, weak, and prone to dissension. The assessed and actual 
characteristics of the émigré groups diverged little which led to the event: the 
underground Trust “impressed émigré circles by its use of resources indicating real 
power” and led to the complete infiltration of their communities.178 
It is worth noting that the deniability of the operation should have been low. The 
apparent ease in which Trust members crossed the Russian border, travelled freely 
throughout Western Europe, and appeared to communicate unhindered amongst 
themselves while in Russia should have sparked suspicion within the White Russian 
groups. However, “the émigrés believed what they wanted to believe, and they accepted 
the Trust at its face value. The Russian émigrés were…ready to follow anyone who 
promised them a way out” and a way back to their homeland.179 Despite what should 
have been an operation of low deniability, Trust maintained its cover as a viable 
underground organization for almost five years. Before Trust was exposed, it  
gained a clear picture of White émigré organizations, their character, 
membership and objectives; it was able to deepened the antagonism 
existing in these organizations and discredit various groups inside the 
USSR; it succeeded in duping foreign intelligence services, particularly 
the Poles, Estonians, and Finns. Its most striking and lasting success was 
psychological; the GPU found, by means of the Trust operation, that it 
possessed tradecraft equal not only to security demands at home, but also, 
with some modifications, commensurate with the requirements of 
psychological operations abroad. From this point on, Russian intelligence 
became a force to be reckoned with worldwide.180  
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The effectiveness of Trust was high, as reported in 1990 “the KGB still numbers 
among its greatest past triumphs the deception operations against the White Guards after 
the Civil War.”181 
Covert actions are not solely a tool of American power, neither is the efficacy of 
viewing covert action as a system limited to American policymakers. The internal logic 
of the system diagram generally holds true regardless of the state accomplishing the 
covert action and by maintaining its generalizability, the system diagram can be applied 
to both U.S. and international examples.  
G. CONCLUSION 
Jefferson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Lenin were all ardent supporters of covert 
action and were responsible for embedding this form of statecraft into international 
strategic history. This chapter has explored these early examples of covert action and 
illustrated the universality of the system diagram to visualize the complex interactions 
within the covert action system. While the vignettes explored here occurred well before 
the current era, policymakers today can apply this same diagram to gain a better 
understanding of how the interactions amongst the system components will influence the 
others and ultimately, the outcome. The next chapter will explore how these systemic 
relationships create emergent properties and system effects.  
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IV. SYSTEM EFFECTS AND COVERT ACTION DURING THE 
COLD WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The possibility of nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was an 
omnipresent specter hanging over the international community throughout the Cold War. 
Two lumbering superpowers teetered on the edge of Schelling’s cliff,182 each mindful of 
the dangers of falling over yet determined to win the ideological battle that was being 
waged between capitalism and communism. While both sides felt a need to counter the 
other’s actions and expand their own spheres of influence, neither side was willing to risk 
turning the Cold War completely hot through overt aggression. Because covert actions 
appeared to offer a relatively safe form of attack, the Cold War was a watershed period 
for covert action. The 41 years between the Berlin Airlift and the fall of the Berlin Wall 
have essentially defined this tool for policymakers and public alike. Spanning from Radio 
Free Europe’s propaganda efforts to support anti-communist dissidents to the 
paramilitary operation against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, Cold War cases 
encompass the entire spectrum of covert action. Indeed, the Cold War dominates covert 
action literature, but studying these events in isolation yields only a surface level 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of a covert action policy; a systems 
approach focusing on system effects, on the other hand, provides a much deeper 
appreciation of the emergent properties and unintended consequences that are created by 
complex interactions.  
This chapter will use the Cold War as a backdrop to explore Robert Jervis’s 
concept of system effects. First, a brief overview of the period will be provided for 
historical reference. The four types of system effects will then be examined: results are 
better explained via interactions, not “additivity;” indirect and delayed effects can be 
more important than direct; relations are rarely bilateral; and outcomes do not always 
                                                 
182 Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling often used the analogy of “dancing at the edge of the cliff” in 
talks and lectures to illustrate the concepts of nuclear deterrence, manipulation of risk, and the rational use 
of irrationality. This concept was further explained in Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1960). 
 68 
follow from intentions.183 A closer look at the complex interactions amongst the system 
components will also be provided. Jervis identifies three types of interactions most often 
seen in systems and contends that because interactions shape the system, analysis could 
be further advanced by making “the interaction itself the unit of analysis.”184  
B. COLD WAR OVERVIEW 
Perhaps the single greatest event to define the twentieth century was not the 
assault on Normandy Beach in 1944 but the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 
1949. Suddenly America was no longer the sole member of the nuclear club and foreign 
policies on both sides of the Atlantic were adjusted to account for the destructive power 
of this new weapon. The emerging conflict started as an ideological battle for Europe but 
with the invasion of Korea in 1950, the “Cold War”185 suddenly went global. The U.S. 
recognized that it now faced an expansionist enemy, one whose foreign policy and 
national identity were defined by “secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the 
wary suspiciousness and the basic unfriendliness of purpose.”186 International relations 
during this period were overwhelmingly focused on the Soviet threat and the challenges 
of how to confront, contain, and rollback communist expansion without pitching the 
world into a nuclear holocaust. For almost 50 years, covert actions met this challenge, 
offering both sides an effective counter to perceived aggression while providing the 
requisite deniability that the nuclear environment demanded. 
The Soviet threat required that America’s institutional framework for conducting 
covert action mature quickly. Prior to the war there was no formal national intelligence 
infrastructure and little covert action continuity. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
was established to support U.S. intelligence requirements during World War Two but fell 
victim to the massive disarmament that followed the war’s end. President Truman did not 
dissolve the OSS out of short-sightedness, however; instead, he sought to “create a more 
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efficient intelligence apparatus than the one that had sufficed in wartime.”187 The 
National Security Act of 1947 was signed in July, formalizing a framework for an 
organization based on the OSS model, but one with more authorization and centralization 
than that which the OSS provided. 
The newly established CIA conducted its first official covert action in 1948 to 
influence the Italian national elections. Italy was a “microcosm of the wider Cold War 
conflict,”188 deemed an area of “enormous strategic value”189 in the upcoming battle 
against communism; therefore, it was imperative that these first democratic elections 
following World War Two not result in communist victories. Through various front 
companies and private citizens, funds and resources were funneled to the Christian 
Democratic Party, enabling them to defeat the Soviet-supported People’s Bloc at the 
polls. Just as important as securing this region for the West, the political action in Italy 
proved to America’s political leadership the efficacy of covert action and established a 
precedent for future use.190 The operation in Italy was quickly followed by successful 
coups in both Iran and Guatemala and by 1955, the U.S. was enjoying the “golden 
age”191 of covert action. 
This honeymoon period did not last. The initial windfall of success was paralleled 
by equally dismal, yet less documented, failures in Albania, Ukraine, and China. The Bay 
of Pigs fiasco in 1961 placed the concept of covert action squarely in the sights of 
government officials, and further botched operations in Indonesia, Congo, Chile, and 
Angola soured the American public and political leadership on the utility of this tool. 
Support later flatlined when Seymour Hersh published a front-page New York Times 
article declaring “Huge CIA Operation Reported in U.S. Against Anti-War Forces, Other 
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Dissidents in Nixon Years.”192 CIA intelligence agents had turned their attention to the 
domestic front and the fears that the agency would become a type of secret police 
appeared to have come to fruition. The “Family Jewels,” an in-house classified report 
detailing illegal and often immoral CIA activities of assassination, domestic surveillance, 
mail fraud, and human drug experimentation193 was submitted to the executive branch 
and a series of Congressional and Executive committees were convened in an attempt to 
regain a modicum of credibility. The organization that once enjoyed carte blanche 
support was now perceived as a “rogue elephant.”194  
The fall from grace of covert action is highlighted in the disparate conclusions of 
three prominent investigative commissions. In 1954, after successful coups in both Iran 
and Guatemala, President Eisenhower commissioned Lieutenant General James Doolittle 
to review the CIA’s performance. Doolittle’s report, known as the Doolittle Commission, 
concluded,  
if the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of ‘fair 
play’ must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and 
counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy 
our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective 
methods than those used against us.195  
Only 20 years later, after the devastating New York Times article and the Family 
Jewels report, Representative James Johnson (R-CO) of the Pike Committee declared the 
CIA “the enemy”196 and the Church Committee “gave serious consideration to proposing 
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a total ban on all forms of covert action” (emphasis in original).197 By the late 1970s, 
covert action “had every indication of a dying art form.”198  
U.S. attitudes toward covert action leveled out and even began to rebound in the 
1980s thanks to the efforts of President Reagan and his focus on confronting the “evil 
empire” by “unleashing the CIA.”199 This, coupled with a reformed congressional 
oversight process, salvaged America’s covert capabilities. Operations were again being 
approved around the globe, culminating with the successful paramilitary campaign in 
Afghanistan that contributed to the downfall of the Soviet empire. Covert action blunders 
still occurred, but as the fallout from the Iran-Contra Affair suggests, they were now 
attributed more to shortcomings of political leadership and oversight instead of inherent 
weaknesses of the covert concept.  
“Covert action” is a uniquely American term but it is far from a uniquely 
American concept. While the U.S. was secretly conducting its shadow war against 
communism, the Soviet Union was responding in kind. The USSR’s “active measures” to 
confront U.S. global influence included “manipulation and media control, written and 
oral disinformation, use of foreign communist parties and front organizations, clandestine 
radio broadcasting, manipulation of the economy, kidnappings, paramilitary operations, 
and support of guerrilla groups and terrorist organizations.”200 Other states also 
incorporated covert action into their respective foreign policies during this time. The 
United Kingdom not only furthered their “special relationship” with the U.S. by building 
a strong partnership between MI6 and CIA but also conducted unilateral operations in 
support of British global interests, most notably their covert involvement in the Yemen 
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Civil War.201 Israel has also long considered covert activities a foundational pillar of 
their national security strategy; one of their more spectacular operations, the “Wrath of 
God” campaign in response to the Munich Olympics terrorist attacks in 1972, used 
compartmented assassination teams to kill anyone directly or indirectly involved in the 
Black September terrorist organization.202  
The range of effectiveness during these five decades was extreme, oscillating 
between resounding successes such as the Italian election support and the Afghanistan 
paramilitary campaign to dismal failures like the Bay of Pigs fiasco. International 
outcomes were just as varied, success on the level of the Soviet Union’s disinformation 
campaign linking the AIDS epidemic to the CIA ran parallel to utter failures such as the 
massive human rights violations institutionalized by Operation Condor in South America. 
Most of these outcomes cannot be explained by one thing, instead, a combination of both 
internal and external factors led to the result. A more thorough understanding of these 
systemic factors could have facilitated better decision-making prior to covert action 
approval, but even if policymakers and covert operators possessed complete 
understanding of the system’s elements, without an appreciation of how interactions can 
lead to system effects, many of the outcomes would still not have been anticipated and 
the ill-conceived actions would still have been executed. The potentialities of system 
effects must be acknowledged if this tool is to be used correctly.  
C. SYSTEM EFFECTS 
Component interactions create emergent properties, “a characteristic that could 
not possibly have been deduced from the nature of its components”203 and it is these 
emergent properties that comprise system effects. Jervis highlights four system effects 
common to many social systems: interactions, not “additivity” better explain system 
output; indirect and delayed effects can be more significant than direct effects; relations 
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are rarely bilateral; and intentions and outcomes do not always align.204 These four 
effects may seem apparent at first. Indeed, academically, it does not take a significant 
leap to recognize the presence of system effects in everyday life, however, intuitively 
“the basic ideas of systems do not come readily to mind and so often are ignored.”205  
The study of systems effects and emergent behavior is well suited to Cold War 
covert action analysis. Because most covert actions during this time were global struggles 
conducted largely through local actors, many interactions and outcomes were difficult, if 
not impossible, to predict. As system effects imply, complex relationships at the local 
level creates behavior not anticipated at the grand strategic level; seemingly small inputs 
and interactions often had quite large repercussions. System effects were made even more 
difficult to predict when policymakers did not have visibility of all of the components. 
Compartmentalization, common in covert action, can lead to reductionist thinking: 
viewing separate components in isolation without considering the 
“interconnectedness”206 of those parts can result in a one-dimensional understanding of 
the system. When policymakers or planners do not have visibility over the entire system, 
it is nearly impossible to ascertain if components are in proper alignment or if 
unanticipated emergent behavior will occur. A systems approach to understanding 
requires that the policymaker sees the entire system, when a portion of the system is 
shrouded in secrecy, anticipating and responding to system effects becomes increasingly 
difficult. 
1. Interactions, not “Additivity” 
The first and arguably most important system effect reiterates the concept of 
emergent properties: interactions amongst components, more so than the qualities of 
those components, determine the system output. Linear models do not apply because one 
“cannot understand systems by summing up the characteristics of the parts.”207 In a 
                                                 
204 Jervis, System Effects, 29. 
205 Jervis, System Effects, 3. 
206 Jervis, System Effects, 17. 
207 Jervis, System Effects, 34. 
 74 
system, A plus B does not lead to C. Instead, A’s interaction with B and subsequent 
interaction with C can very well lead to Z. Jervis lists three types of interactions most 
common in systems and suggests that because systems are defined by their interactions, 
using the interaction itself as the unit of analysis can further advance understanding.208  
Interaction #1—Results Cannot Be Predicted from Separate Actions:209 Covert 
action outcomes cannot be predicted from any individual component within the system. 
No component in isolation will determine an outcome; it is the interactions of 
components with each other that will lead to a particular effect. For example, target 
characteristics alone will not determine the effectiveness of a covert action. A weak target 
will not automatically result in an effective action just as a secure target will not 
automatically lead to an ineffective action. Instead, the interaction of the various system 
components on that target will ultimately determine the level of effectiveness. Noting that 
“the effect of one variable frequently depends on the state of another”210 may appear to 
be a truism but evidence suggests that despite most understanding this idea at the 
conceptual level, many do not always transition it to practice. Too often the interaction 
amongst the variables within the system are ignored in favor of only considering the 
components themselves.  
The Bay of Pigs fiasco is perhaps the best example of this type of tunnel vision. In 
retrospect, it is clear that the operation should never have proceeded the way it did. 
Intelligence estimates assumed that the Castro regime was weak and unprepared for an 
assault, the type of action had escalated from a low-level propaganda effort to an 
expansive paramilitary campaign, and the thin cover story was unable to account for the 
many overt signals. Viewing these factors in isolation led to a belief that the deficiencies 
of the plan could be overcome. Viewing these factors as interrelated components, 
however, would have shown that the Bay of Pigs operation was destined to fail. The 
faulty intelligence assessment that Castro’s regime was weak and that 3,000–5,000 
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guerrillas stood ready to support Brigade 2506 once it landed211 led decision makers to 
transition the type of action to something more closely resembling a “large-scale 
amphibious landing.”212 The increase in the size of the invasion force then required a 
larger and more visible training and staging area in Guatemala; the size of the camp 
coupled with the already weak cover story led to premature exposure of the plan and 
allowed Castro to prepare his forces and successfully defend his island. Individually, the 
limitations of each component could have been overcome; as a system, the interactions 
exacerbated their effects and eventually led to disaster. These interactions should have 
informed policy makers that the plan as written was doomed to failure. Unfortunately 
they did not. Three days after the invasion, only 26 members of Brigade 2506 had 
avoided being captured or killed213 and America was left reeling from an international 
embarrassment.  
The Bay of Pigs also illustrates the point that too much of a good thing can be 
problematic. Because the system operates in a non-linear way, more of the same element 
does not produce more of the same result. If A leads to B, twice of A does not necessarily 
lead to twice of B. In fact, because the aim of a covert action is for the sponsor to remain 
hidden, sometimes the increase in one element is actually detrimental to the system’s 
effectiveness. Operation PLUTO initially called for a small band of guerrilla exiles 
supported by a propaganda campaign to undermine Castro’s popular support. Quickly, 
however, the CIA realized the original plan would not work and expanded the exile force 
to 1,400 personnel and the concept of operation to a paramilitary amphibious assault.214 
If a small band of guerrillas can produce X results, doubling the size of the force does not 
produce 2X results. Rarely does basic algebra work in policy formulation.  
Interaction #2—Strategies Depend on the Strategies of Others 215 Covert actions 
are not conducted with or against inanimate actors. Instead, they are often executed in 
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partnership with a friendly element against an adversarial target; these actors can 
understandably have separate goals and ambitions that do not align neatly with U.S. 
objectives. The Church Committee correctly deduced that a “covert action can be a 
success when the objective of the project is to support an individual, a party, or a 
government in doing what that individual, party, or government wants to do—and when 
it has the will and capacity to do it.”216 When the objective requires convincing an 
individual, party or government in doing something they do not have the desire, will or 
capacity to do, “success” becomes more challenging.  
The impact of this interaction can be seen in the U.S. relationship with Chile. In 
1970, the Chilean citizens elected Salvador Allende in a democratic presidential election. 
Unfortunately for Allende, he leaned to the left and President Richard Nixon was 
determined to keep him out of the presidential palace despite his democratic victory. 
Nixon told CIA Director Richard Helms “in no uncertain terms to foment a preventive 
coup.”217 CIA officials saw little possibility of success and were hesitant to construct a 
government takeover. President Frei, the sitting president, General Schneider, the Chilean 
chief of staff, and the majority of the military were staunch supporters of both the 
constitution and the democratic process and therefore loath to block Allende’s ascension 
to power.218 Despite these obstacles, Track II was set in motion. Brigadier General Viaux 
was eventually vetted by the CIA to lead the coup but the prospects of success remained 
“bleak.”219 The CIA temporarily withdrew support for Viaux after reviewing his plan and 
determining that a coup “cannot succeed.”220 Viaux had his own ambitions, however, and 
proceeded with an overly complicated plot to kidnap Schneider, force Frei to flee the 
country, install a military junta, dissolve the Congress, and govern the country until a 
more suitable replacement could be found. The CIA’s prediction about the odds of 
success was spot on; Schneider was shot in the bungled kidnapping attempt which 
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“rallied the Army firmly behind the flag of constitutionalism.”221 Allende was confirmed 
as president on October 24. 
CIA officers were never confident in the abilities of Viaux and were more 
supportive of Track I, the covert program to subtlety back political opposition and foment 
economic troubles. Despite these misgivings, however, Track I did not receive priority 
and instead Nixon pushed for a poorly conceived coup and solicited a partner whose “will 
and capacity” did not coincide with the U.S. objectives. Once again America was seen as 
meddling, poorly, in the internal affairs of another state. A successful coup was executed 
three years later when Allende was shot on the steps of the capital and General Pinochet 
began a reign of “brutality and repression”222 that would last 17 years. While there is still 
much debate about the level of CIA involvement in this second coup, because of the 1970 
attempt the U.S. will likely be forever considered guilty by historical association. 
Counterfactual debates are often subjective and arbitrary, but it is interesting to consider 
how different Chile’s history would be had Track I’s more subtle approach to countering 
Allende’s leftist party been given priority instead of focusing on Track II’s coup attempt 
via a partner whose ambitions were not in alignment with U.S. objectives. 
Interaction #3—Behavior Changes the Environment:223 The third interaction 
contends that behavior within the system changes the environment outside the system. 
Nothing occurs in isolation. Viewing Cold War history from a 21st-century perspective, 
many consider the communist threat as “overhyped.”224 In the Congo, for example, the 
CIA executed one of the largest covert campaigns of the time with the intent of keeping 
Soviet influence out of the region.225 The long-running operation eventually resulted in 
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the assassination of President Patrice Lumumba226 and the installment of a military 
dictatorship under Joseph Mobutu. But “Congo scholars have long been skeptical of the 
notion that had Lumumba stayed in power, his government would have fallen under the 
sway of the Soviet Union or China.”227 This skepticism ignores system interactions, 
specifically, that the communist threat in the Congo may have been insignificant 
precisely because the U.S. operated there. U.S. behavior in the region changed the 
environment. The communist threat may have appeared overestimated because American 
involvement made a Soviet play for influence not worth the effort. Every action has an 
effect, not only on the system itself but also on the larger environment. 
2. Indirect and Delayed Results 
The second system effect suggests that complex interactions can create “indirect, 
mediated, and delayed”228 results. A small change in one part of the system can have 
significant, though perhaps not immediate, effects on the rest of the system. Covert 
actions by their nature often take an indirect approach to problem sets and low scale 
covert actions such as propaganda and economic activities often depend on indirect and 
delayed effects. Recently declassified documents detailing AEDINOSAUR, a CIA-MI6 
partnership to smuggle copies of Boris Pasternak’s banned novel Doctor Zhivago into the 
Soviet Union and satellite states, illustrates this point. The goal of DINOSAUR and the 
larger “covert literature campaign” was to “subtly undermine the Soviet system by—as 
the CIA put it—‘reinforcing predispositions towards cultural and intellectual freedom, 
and dissatisfaction with its absence’.”229 By 1991, the program had smuggled over 10 
million books and periodicals through the Iron Curtain.230 The effort was considered by 
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the agency to be “demonstrably effective…and can inferentially be said to influence 
attitudes and reinforce predispositions toward intellectual and cultural freedom, and 
dissatisfaction with its absence.”231 It was understood that cultural and propaganda 
campaigns could not directly combat Soviet expansion. Instead, effectiveness relied on 
the indirect and delayed results that would emerge from introducing pro-Western and 
anti-Soviet films, books, and magazines into Eastern-controlled territory.  
Unfortunately, if not managed correctly, indirect and delayed effects can 
sometimes lead to disastrous results. As the Church Committee reported, covert actions 
have often created states with “debilitating dependence on the U.S.”232 It has been argued 
that the CIA’s constant involvement in the internal affairs of the Congo in the 1960s 
stunted the natural growth of domestic political institutions that indirectly led to the 
state’s complete implosion in 1997 and a decade of conflict in which at least 5 million 
have died.233 From the moment Congolese gained its independence from Belgium, the 
CIA successfully persuaded the regime to eschew communist support, yet the constant 
manipulation of the Congo government through covert activities “discouraged Congolese 
politicians from building genuine bases of support and adopting responsible policies.”234 
This lack of political growth eventually led to an environment “characterized by 
corruption, political turmoil, and dependence on Western military intervention.”235 The 
Congo collapsed in 1997 because of a variety of factors but the legacy of CIA 
dependence that began in the 1960s undoubtedly contributed to its downfall. 
The Congo example leads to a second point, that “indirect effects may be more 
important than direct ones.”236 Debates on the importance of indirect versus direct effects 
abound when discussing covert actions; in fact, it is hard to review the 1953 Iranian coup 
or the 1989 Afghanistan paramilitary campaign without confronting these types of 
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rhetorical arguments. Was the 1979 Iranian revolution an indirect result of the 1953 coup 
and was this more important than 25 years of stability in the region during the height of 
the Cold War? Was the founding of al Qaeda an indirect result of the paramilitary 
operation in Afghanistan and was this more important than defeating the Soviet Army? 
This line of discussion has likely been taken to its conclusion and further analysis of Iran 
or Afghanistan activities adds little to the existing understanding. 
A less well-known example highlighting the importance of indirect over direct 
effects is that of STCIRCUS, the paramilitary operation to support the Tibetan rebels that 
began in 1956. Spanning nearly two decades, the CIRCUS operation trained and 
equipped Tibetan rebels to harass China’s People’s Liberation Army. The CIA was 
unable to instigate the massive popular resistance movement that it desired but the 
operation did achieve at least one major intelligence victory when documents detailing 
failures in the “Great Leap Forward” were captured in a raid. The indirect effect of 
CIRCUS was much more significant. Although the program was considered “one of the 
more profitable operations”237 run by the CIA, it was abruptly cancelled in 1972, shortly 
before President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Zedong.238 It is not a stretch of the 
imagination to believe that the Nixon administration used the CIRCUS operation as a 
bargaining chip to begin negotiations with China. Directly, CIRCUS had little more than 
a peripheral impact on Red China. Indirectly, however, it may have helped open the door 
for Nixon to enter China and provided the U.S. with a diplomatic victory.239  
                                                 
237 Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, 154. 
238 Jonathan Mirsky, “Tibet: The CIA’s Cancelled War,” The New York Review of Books, April 9, 
2013. 
239 As with many historical accounts of covert actions, there is little agreement about whether the 
shutdown of CIRCUS was on the table during negotiations prior to the Nixon-Mao engagements. Jonathan 
Kenneth Knauss in “Official Policies and Covert Programs: The U.S. State Department, the CIA, and the 
Tibetan Resistance” acknowledges that it is “conventional wisdom” that the U.S. withdrew support in 
response to Chinese requests but he refutes this claim by pointing out that “the record does not bear this 
out.” Briefing papers, notes, and memoranda detailing negotiations prior to Nixon’s visit “makes no 
mention of Tibet by either party.” However, according to Tim Weiner in Legacy of Ashes: The History of 
the CIA (New York: Anchor Books, 2007) Kissinger was quoted as saying to Chinese Prime Minister Chou 
En-lai prior to Nixon’s trip that “we are conscious of what is at stake in our relationship, and we will not let 
one organization carry out petty operations that could hinder this course” (p. 350). 
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The KGB’s dezinformatsiya campaigns were also dependent on indirect effects. 
The KGB took a “total approach to influence and deception operations” and KGB 
officers were expected to spend at least 25% of their time planning and executing 
disinformation campaigns.240 Examples of USSR disinformation include their effort to 
link the FBI to the Kennedy assassination, West German politicians to Nazi supporters, 
and the CIA to the Jonestown Massacre in Guiana.241  
One of the more successful disinformation operations that is still adversely 
impacting U.S. relations in Africa today was Operation Infektion, an intense propaganda 
campaign “proving” that the AIDS virus was artificially created at Fort Detrick, MD and 
intentionally spread by American agents. In 1983, KGB’s Service A, the organization 
responsible for active measures, published an “anonymous” letter in the Indian 
newspaper Patriot entitled “AIDS May Invade India: Mystery Disease Caused by U.S. 
Experiments.”242 The article did not gain much traction and the campaign was shelved 
for two years until it was picked up by East German scientist Dr. Jakob Segal. KGB 
agents reportedly met with Segal, provided him with “evidence” as to the origin of the 
AIDS virus, and requested that he “look into the matter.”243 Segal soon became a zealot 
of the cause, publishing multiple “scientific” papers and embarking on numerous 
speaking tours to espouse his belief that AIDS was a CIA plot. Through KGB support the 
conspiracy quickly gained momentum and by 1987 Segel’s “findings” were being 
circulated in 80 countries, 200 periodicals, and 25 languages.244 
The idea that the U.S. would intentionally spread a deadly disease seems 
ludicrous. However, a CIA report claimed that “even though reliable statistics are hard to 
come by, it seems reasonable to conclude that many Africans believe the claim” that 
AIDS was an American invention.245 As a response to Western protests and the “new 
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thinking” foreign policy reforms instituted by Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviet Union 
officially disavowed the idea that AIDS was an American experiment and shutdown the 
operation in October 1987.246 The damage was done, however, and an official statement 
in Moscow did little to convince those around the world of the real origin of the deadly 
disease. American aid and influence efforts in the African region were hampered. In fact, 
the effects can still be felt today. A Liberian newspaper published an article in September 
2014 claiming the recent Ebola outbreak is a U.S. plot to depopulate the planet and 
Internet stories have surfaced claiming that the Center for Disease Control has patented 
the virus to cash in on a vaccine.247 While conspiracy theories are not uncommon, the 
fact that the CIA was so publicly blamed for the spread of AIDS for years makes other 
conspiracies that much easier to catch fire. Long after the fall of the Soviet Union, their 
dezinformatsiya campaigns can still undermine the U.S. efforts throughout the world. 
Indirect and delayed effects are common to systems but they are hard to predict. It 
is important to understand that the covert action system diagram and system thinking are 
not predictive tools. While policymakers should think through this model and anticipate 
indirect results, they must be careful planning entire policies off “expected” indirect 
effects. Small changes in one element can produce great, but often unanticipated, changes 
in another and the complexity inherent in the system’s interactions can wreak havoc on 
policy prediction. Just as it is difficult to anticipate the butterfly that flaps its wings in 
Asia will create a hurricane in Florida, it would have been hard to predict that the Tibetan 
rebel who trained in the mountains of Colorado may contribute to Nixon and Mao sitting 
down at the table in Beijing, or that an “anonymous letter” published in an obscure Indian 
newspaper would adversely affect U.S. efforts in the African region 30 years later. 
3. Relations Are Often Not Bilaterally Determined 
Eisenhower noted that “anyone who becomes immersed in international affairs 
soon realizes that no important issue exists in isolation; rarely is it only bilateral.”248 This 
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maxim of international relations was even more pronounced during the Cold War. Most 
of the covert activities the U.S. conducted around the globe indirectly targeted the Soviet 
Union through third world countries, non-aligned states, or third parties. The propaganda 
campaign, covert political support, and labor strikes that the U.S. sponsored in British 
Guiana in the early 1960s likely had little to do with U.S. concern for the Guianese 
citizens. Instead, they were intended to prevent another Soviet foothold from being 
established in the Western hemisphere. Similarly, the 1961 covert economic activity in 
support of labor unions in Venezuela was arguably not motivated by empathy for the 
Venezuelan worker; instead, it was used to counter a Cuban-backed insurrection in the 
country.249 Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. use of covert actions within developing 
states was rarely intended solely for the targeted state; they were nearly always executed 
to counter the seemingly omnipresent threat of communist expansion.  
As the U.S. directed much of its covert energy toward the USSR through third 
parties, the Soviet Union was doing the same in response. Soviet defector Anatoli 
Golitsyn confirmed in 1959 that the KGB’s primary mission had become “covert 
statecraft: the use of agents and other mechanisms to achieve the USSR’s geopolitical 
goals”250 by countering their “main adversary,”251 the United States. Elections in 
Western Europe and third world countries were often seen as “nothing more than hidden 
struggles between the CIA and KGB to secure the government for their respective 
countries.”252 On the other end of the covert action ladder, each state waged a proxy war 
against the other. The CIA’s support of paramilitary organizations throughout Africa, 
South America, and Asia is well documented and “the KGB, almost without exception, 
supported proxy armies in the same areas opposed to those the CIA supported.”253 Few 
areas around the globe were untouched by the overarching conflict between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union. Both states established relationships with other countries but those 
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relationships were far from bilateral. Instead, they were often indirect multilateral 
relationships intended as another avenue of confrontation between the two superpowers.  
The importance of multilateral relationships is also apparent within the covert 
action system itself. It is important when dealing with covert actions to understand that 
few things internal to the system are affected by only one interaction and resist the 
temptation to oversimplify outcomes. Kennedy stated after the Bay of Pigs disaster that 
the “the chief apparent causes of failure were gaps in our intelligence.”254 While it is true 
there were gaping holes in the intelligence picture prior to the assault, this was only one 
of many failures and arguably not “the chief apparent cause.” The failure in Cuba was the 
result of a multitude of interrelated factors, boiling down the cause to only a few issues is 
an attempt to impose a linear model on a non-linear system. Similarly, the KGBs 
successful use of provokatisya, the art of “taking control of your enemies in secret and 
encouraging them to do things that discredit them and help you,”255 was not simply the 
result of the interaction between the tool, provokatisya, and the target, the individual. 
Provokatisya operations succeeded because of the complex interactions between the 
target, the tool, the level of deniability, and the environmental context. The outcomes of 
covert actions, both as a whole and within the system itself, cannot be boiled down to 
simple bilateral cause-and-effect explanations. Attempting to oversimplify relationships 
can lead to a misunderstanding of the system’s behavior.  
4. Outcomes Do Not Necessarily Follow From Intentions 
Jervis’s key system effect finding is that “outcomes do not follow from 
intentions.”256 Cold War history is replete with cases of good intentions leading to bad 
outcomes. Before proceeding, though, it must be noted that the study of covert action 
pays “disproportionate attention”257 to those situations when outcomes did not follow 
from intentions. When intentions and outcomes align, little concern is paid; yet when 
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they diverge sharply, policymakers and the public often “call out for explanation.”258 It is 
possible that a higher proportion of covert actions are considered failures because some 
successful activities may either still remain secret or do not elicit the attention that 
“failed” operations receive. Regardless of success or failure, however, the existence of 
complex interactions means that “you can never do just one thing.”259 Any single act 
causes ripples throughout the system making it nearly impossible to isolate direct cause-
and-effect relationships, therefore making it extremely difficult to align intentions and 
outcomes. Despite how well-built a plan is, results are hard to anticipate and the outcome 
can be far removed from the original intent.  
The discrepancy between outcome and intentions was vividly illustrated in 1956. 
In what some consider an “unprecedented intelligence coup,”260 the CIA obtained the 
transcript of an inflammatory speech given by Secretary Khrushchev to the Soviet 
Communist Party in which he denounced Stalin’s rule as an “inhuman and unnecessary 
oppression of the Soviet people and the peoples of satellite states.”261 Eisenhower elected 
to use Radio Free Europe’s (RFE) covert communication networks and release the speech 
in its entirety to increase pressure on the Soviet Union. What followed was far from what 
was intended. RFE’s implicit message of U.S. support to any state that broke free from 
Soviet control bolstered the confidence of dissident groups and persuaded a Hungarian 
organization led by Imre Nagy to seize control of the government and declare that 
Hungary would remove itself from the Warsaw Pact.262 The Soviet Union quickly 
responded by crushing the resistance through an overt military invasion. Despite the 
intention simply to increase pressure on the Soviet Union and offer economic assistance 
to resistance groups, the release of the speech indirectly led to Soviet tanks rolling across 
the border, a situation the U.S. was not prepared to address with a commensurate military  
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response. Furthermore, other dissident groups “lost confidence in American promises of 
aid and support”263 making it increasingly difficult to confront ongoing Soviet aggression 
in Eastern Europe. 
Similarly, President Reagan’s intent to bypass statutory regulations and support 
the Nicaraguan Contras while negotiating for the release of American hostages in an 
intricate “arms-for-hostage” deal also resulted in an outcome far from what was intended. 
The National Security Council’s (NSC) complex and convoluted plan created a situation 
in which any small change in one portion of the system created repercussions throughout. 
The NSC’s house of cards collapsed when a Southern Air Transport aircraft crashed in 
Honduras and the pilot, Eugene Hasenfus, was detained at the same time an article 
detailing the arms-for-hostage deal was published in Lebanon. The exposure of the Iran-
Contra Affair was not caused solely by Hasenfus’s admission of working for the CIA, nor 
was it caused by the Lebanese article outlining the hostage recovery attempts; it was the 
result of intertwined connections and interactions that linked the Nicaraguan Contras to 
Iranian moderates to a Lebanese terrorist group to a Swiss bank account to a CIA-
sponsored air transport company to Reagan’s national security team. The system created 
to secretly negotiate for the release of hostages while arming a group of “freedom 
fighters”264 by selling weapons to a country that had cut diplomatic ties was so complex 
that one small tweak resonated across the system, leading to outcomes that greatly 
diverged from intentions. 
In both situations, the outcomes were not the result of direct cause and effect 
relationships but of complex interactions within the system. The release of the 
Khrushchev speech did not cause the Hungarian invasion. Similarly, the detained pilot 
did not expose the Iran-Contra Affair. Despite the best-laid plans, interactions can 
sometimes create echo chambers that exacerbate small changes and lead to very different 
results than what was originally intended. Within systems, “interconnections and 
interactions create sufficient complexity so that it would be surprising if the results 
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conformed to statesmen’s anticipations.”265 Acknowledging that outcomes do not 
necessarily follow from intentions is not to offer an apologist’s view of history. Instead, it 
is to reiterate that plans do not always unfold exactly as expected and unintended 
consequences are likely to occur. 
Operation Condor is a valuable lesson of what can happen when good intentions 
go bad. While it may appear almost morally dismissive to discuss Operation Condor 
under the heading that “outcomes do not always follow from intentions,” it is illustrative 
of the potentially dangerous relationship that can develop between intentions and 
outcomes. Operation Condor was established in 1975 to support anti-communist efforts 
throughout South America. It was to be a sophisticated military network between Chile, 
Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil that involved a “system of command, 
control, intelligence, exchange of prisoners, and combined operations.”266 The intention, 
as referenced in official documentation, was quite innocuous: establish a formal military 
network of partner countries to share information and capabilities to support anti-
communist efforts, something akin to a “regional Interpol.”267 The outcome, however, 
was quite different. Condor turned into a campaign of “death squad operations”268 whose 
primary objective was to “disappear” subversives who were “classified and targeted 
based on their political ideas rather than illegal acts.”269 In 1992, the “Archive of Terror” 
was discovered in Paraguay which detailed many of Condor’s human rights violations to 
include kidnapping, torture, assassinations, and disappearances. Most alarming was 
Condor’s “Phase 3” which called for “the formation of special teams from member 
countries assigned to travel anywhere in the world to nonmember countries to carry out 
sanctions—including assassinations—against Condor enemies.”270 It is unclear the level 
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of direct involvement the U.S. had with Operation Condor, however, evidence has 
emerged to show the U.S. was at least knowledgeable of and complicit in the activities. 
CIA and FBI documents refer to Condor activities and Henry Kissinger supposedly 
assured South American governments of the Ford administration’s support.271 The 
intention of Operation Condor may have been just; in the global context of a heightened 
fear of the spread of communism, an information-sharing and operational support 
network between allies to help combat a common enemy was a legitimate endeavor. The 
outcome, however, was far from morally, ethically, or legally acceptable.  
Covert actions are powerful because of their ability to deny state involvement, but 
this ability to operate secretly should not be considered a green light to bypass the 
protection of basic human rights. Secrecy for influence is necessary in international 
relations, but secrecy to cover for immoral acts such as kidnapping, torture, and 
assassination of political opponents is not. Intentions and outcomes can naturally diverge 
because of complex systemic interactions. However, they should not be intentionally 
distanced in order to provide plausible deniability between the concept of an operation 
and the practice of that operation. In this case, the concept of forming a “regional 
Interpol” was intentionally distanced from the practice of a complex network facilitating 
the kidnapping and torture of political prisoners. Secrecy is a powerful enabler, 
policymakers cannot allow the comforting blanket of secrecy be an excuse to travel down 
the slippery slope of human rights abuses.  
A detailed exploration of the ethical and moral considerations covert action 
requires is outside the scope of this thesis. However, it is incumbent upon those 
policymakers involved to ensure that intentions and outcomes do not diverge so sharply 
as to be classified as morally and ethically repugnant. The Doolittle Commission asserted 
that in order to survive against a subversive enemy, “long-standing American concepts of 
‘fair play’ must be reconsidered.”272 There is a vast difference between giving up the 
notion of fair play and completely jettisoning American values.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
Covert actions are complex. Rarely does any one factor within the covert action 
system determine the outcome of the action; instead, dynamic interactions amongst the 
components lead to system effects. As evidenced by various Cold War examples, system 
effects can manifest throughout the range of covert activities. Without an understanding 
and appreciation of system effects and interactions, the power of this tool can be 
misunderstood. A balance needs to be struck between considering the potential for 
system effects, however, and being caught in a “paralysis by system effects analysis”273 
spiral. While it is imperative that policymakers think through the various permutations a 
plan may take, they cannot become immobilized by the thought of unintended 
consequences.  
System effects are an inevitable byproduct of a covert action policy. As 
policymakers are tracking the effectiveness of an action, they must also be cognizant of 
the derivative effects that action is having within and on the larger system. To recognize 
these effects, policymakers must be alert to system feedback. The next chapter will 
discuss feedback and tradeoffs and demonstrate how understanding these concepts can 
enhance the policymaker’s awareness of system effects and allow for the adjustment of 
the system’s behavior accordingly.  
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V. FEEDBACK, TRADEOFFS, AND POST-COLD WAR COVERT 
ACTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On November 9, 1989, the free world received some amazing images from behind 
the Iron Curtain. Citizens of East Germany flooded through checkpoints into West 
Germany and soon residents of both sides stood atop the Berlin Wall with pickaxes and 
hammers. Those who had been pinned under the yoke of communism took the 
opportunity to send a clear message about being masters of their own fate. Within a year 
Germany was reunified and on December 26, 1991 the Soviet Union itself ceased to 
exist. The Cold War was over. But instead of ushering in an era of peace and tranquility, 
this new period became one of uncertainty and ambiguity. Communism was largely 
defeated yet the world soon appeared even more unstable and insecure than ever. For 
nearly 50 years covert action had been a relatively safe way for the nuclear superpowers 
to confront one another; this tool would now prove its versatility by being applied against 
the new, emerging threats to the international community: “rogue states”274 and violent 
non-state actors. 
This chapter will explore the concepts of system feedback and tradeoffs by 
examining covert actions mounted during the post-Cold War timeframe. First, the 
evolution of covert action from the end of the Cold War through the uncertainty of the 
post-Cold War period will be quickly reviewed. Key ideas about feedback will be 
explained using vignettes from both the domestic and international environments. Two 
examples from the cyber realm will then be explored to show how recent advances in 
cyber technology have allowed for feedback to be incorporated directly into the covert 
action tool. Finally, the two major tradeoffs inherent in the covert action system will be 
studied. Feedback and tradeoffs are basic yet central features of the systems approach. 
Understanding and appreciating these concepts will allow policymakers to apply the 
covert action system more effectively; misunderstanding or ignoring either feedback or 
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tradeoffs can lead to, at best, an inefficient use of the tool, but at worst, a 
counterproductive and potentially destructive policy.  
Before proceeding, it is important to note an inevitable analytic bias that is present 
when studying this most recent period of covert action. While there are many examples 
of both acknowledged and exposed covert actions available for review, this may be a 
skewed proportion of the total number executed. It is possible that other covert actions 
have been conducted recently, or are currently underway, whose full impact on the 
international community remains hidden. Despite the understandable security restrictions 
that surround the current period, however, sufficient examples of both effective and 
ineffective operations have emerged to allow for a survey of system feedback and 
tradeoffs. 
B. POST-COLD WAR OVERVIEW 
A shift of focus within the national security consciousness was beginning to take 
place even before the Soviet Union collapsed. While the covert war in Afghanistan was 
being waged, some U.S. intelligence professionals saw the next threats looming on the 
horizon: international terrorism, rogue states, and violent non-state actors. With the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, some pundits began to talk of “a new world order”275 
and the “end of history;”276 however, former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
James Woolsey saw the security environment quite differently. He testified before 
Congress, “We have slain a large dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a 
bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to 
keep track of.”277 Woolsey went on to further identify these snakes as “the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles to carry them; ethnic and national 
hatreds that can metastasize across large portions of the globe; the international narcotics 
trade; terrorism; the dangers inherent in the West’s dependence on Middle East oil; new 
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economic and environmental challenges.”278 The dragon was gone but in its place was a 
whole array of threats for the Intelligence Community to confront.  
Despite this foreshadowing by the then-DCI, the CIA faced the same “peace 
dividend” cutbacks that many other security and defense organizations were 
experiencing. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, Senate Intelligence Committee 
Chairman Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) recommended “alarming and unprecedented”279 
budget cuts and significant reductions in Agency personnel while a premium was placed 
on modernization and efficiency. Budgetary programs were reprioritized as the Clinton 
administration felt the nation “could get by with fewer spies”280 by investing more 
heavily in the technical means of intelligence. There was also a rush to reform as six 
separate panels were convened to study the U.S. intelligence effort and recommend 
reforms.281 This collection of reform committees eventually culminated with the 
Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996 which increased the DCI’s control over 
budget and senior level manning but did little to streamline interagency coordination to 
better deal with post-Cold War challenges.  
During this period of bureaucratic turmoil, the threats many intelligence analysts 
had foreseen were beginning to surface. In 1993, a Pakistani shot and killed two CIA 
employees at the Agency’s Dolley Madison gate. Less than two months later a truck 
bomb exploded underneath the World Trade Center. In 1996, Osama bin Laden, then a 
little known Saudi millionaire, issued his first fatwa against the U.S., a “Declaration of 
War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.”282 Two years 
later, he issued a second fatwa declaring an “individual duty for every Muslim”283 to kill 
Americans and their allies. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and 
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Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were bombed killing over 200 and injuring almost 5,000.284 As 
the Intelligence Community was dealing with these terrorist attacks, presidential findings 
were published to authorize covert actions against Slobodan Milosevic in Bosnia and 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The already trimmed-down community was forced to spread 
itself even thinner.  
The terrorist attacks that rocked the nation on September 11, 2001 and the 
subsequent reforms that were implemented shortly thereafter significantly reshaped the 
intelligence bureaucracy. The recommendations published in The 9/11 Commission 
Report285 and enacted in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 are well documented and 
beyond the scope of this thesis. What is less well known, however, is the impact the 
period immediately following September 11th had on covert action. As a result of the 
military’s necessary reliance on the CIA during the initial stages of the conflict in 
Afghanistan, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld “became determined to build up 
the Pentagon’s special operations capabilities to eliminate any future dependence on the 
CIA.”286 Rumsfeld successfully pushed through an amendment to the defense 
authorization bill that “granted [SOCOM] the authority, for the first time, to spend money 
to pay informants, recruit foreign paramilitary fighters, and purchase equipment or other 
items from foreigners.”287 The Pentagon’s new covert authorities and capabilities would 
help shape the upcoming Global War on Terror and the role of covert action in U.S. 
national security. 
A revolutionary change in information technology was also underway during this 
period. As a result of advances in cyber technology, the possibility of cyberwar288 and 
the potential of weaponizing the Internet emerged. Russia’s distributed denial of service 
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(DDoS) attacks in Estonia in 2007 followed by a second round targeting Georgia in 2008, 
as well as the alleged joint U.S.-Israeli sponsorship of the 2010 Stuxnet worm that 
targeted Iranian centrifuges ushered in a new era of covert action: state-sponsored cyber 
attacks. The impacts and implications of a “cybotage”289 capability are only beginning to 
take shape, yet they already show considerable promise for the covert action system.  
Once the Iron Curtain fell, only a few called for the complete abolition of covert 
action.290 Based on the central role covert action played in Cold War politics, it would 
not have been unreasonable to assume that its prominence in international relations would 
at least diminish. To the contrary, covert action appears to be still firmly embedded in the 
foreign policies of many states. Iran has allegedly sponsored the Shamoon cyber attack 
on the oil giant Saudi Aramco that led to “among the most destructive acts of computer 
sabotage on a company to date.”291 China has recently been linked to the DDoS attacks 
on websites supporting the democratic protests in Hong Kong;292 they have also been 
accused of developing fake mobile apps that promote the Occupy Central movement in 
order to monitor and disrupt the demonstrations.293 Russia now appears to be reverting to 
a Cold War mind frame with its increased use of covert operations against its neighbors 
in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine as well as the recent breech of the White House 
unclassified computer system.294 Covert action still provides states with something they 
cannot get from any other policy tool: influence with deniability. Far from going out of 
style, covert action seems to be experiencing a reemergence worldwide.  
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C. SYSTEM FEEDBACK 
Like many other aspects of the systems approach, feedback is a simple concept 
with powerful implications. Defined simply as the “return of information,”295 feedback 
refers to the “circular causality”296 process that distinguishes systems from linear models. 
Information is created by the interaction amongst components, that information is then 
returned to the system through feedback. As shown in Figure 15, outputs become inputs 
as the information flows back into the system in a continuous feedback loop.  
 
Figure 15.  System feedback diagram. 
The system’s output becomes input in a continuous feedback loop. 
Feedback is present in nearly all aspects of life. The automobile system provides 
feedback to the driver by illuminating a warning light when the engine is overheating. 
The immune system provides feedback to the body by increasing its core temperature 
when it is battling an illness. Even the U.S. governmental system is founded on the 
principle of feedback; feedback through checks and balances prevents any one branch of 
government from becoming too powerful. Feedback not only communicates the status of 
the system, it also changes the original system as the feedback is incorporated. The driver 
stops the automobile until the problem is fixed, the body sleeps more until the illness is 
defeated, and the legislative and executive branches adjust their relationships.  
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Feedback is so prevalent in everyday life that the effects are often overlooked. 
Unfortunately, because “feedback and circular causality are not well understood” the 
“applicability and explanatory power are seen to be limited.”297 An appreciation of 
feedback, however, can lead to a better understanding of the system’s behavior and 
direction. Whether the system is out of synch or running smoothly, feedback will convey 
the message; but this message is lost if feedback is ignored. Feedback leads to an 
evolution of the system and if the “looping”298 effects are not taken into account, the 
system may appear to be changing inexplicably. Covert actions have far too much 
potential to support or harm national security to ignore these key components of system 
behavior.  
Feedback manifests in two forms, represented in Figure 16: internal and external. 
Internal feedback is created by the interactions amongst components which in turn 
influences and changes those components. These interactions also create external 
feedback, information that is released to the environment in the form of operational 
signature. 
 
Figure 16.  Covert action system feedback. 
There are two types of covert action feedback: internal and external. 
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Perhaps the most visible display of internal feedback is the way in which the 
function of the system influences the decision maker. Figure 17 portrays how the output 
of a covert action cycle flows back to the decision maker, altering his outlook, affecting 
his experience and influencing his attitude toward risk in future iterations.  
 
Figure 17.  Decision maker over time cycle. 
The output of each covert action becomes input into the next covert action cycle, 
influencing the decision maker’s future assessments on the viability of its use. 
Bill Clinton’s presidency is an example of this effect. Upon taking office, 
President Clinton, in DCI Woolsey’s words, was “entirely uninterested in foreign 
affairs.”299 The DCI’s access to the president nearly disappeared and it was rumored that, 
“Clinton never really liked the CIA.”300 However, over time his foreign policy became 
heavily dependent on covert operations. An administration that initially came to the 
White House with a reluctance to use covert means eventually published multiple 
presidential findings for operations in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. From Clinton’s 
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perspective, feedback conveyed that covert action was an effective means of conducting 
foreign policy, and the system began to evolve into more aggressive and intensive 
operations. In Iraq for example, Clinton initially saw the President George H. W. Bush-
approved finding to remove Saddam Hussein as “too fat”301 and attempted to cut the 
program’s budget by an estimated 50 percent.302 The budget cut did not happen, 
however, and Clinton soon saw the benefits of a covert policy in that region, over time 
approving a range of covert actions to support opposition programs. What began as a 
“general, broad based propaganda effort”303 against Saddam eventually evolved into 
DBACHILLES, a series of operations providing paramilitary support to various dissident 
groups from 1994–1996.304  
This example also highlights that feedback “applies only to information,”305 and 
therefore is open to interpretation by key actors. Feedback is not the physical 
manifestation of the interactions within the system but rather the information resulting 
from those. Just as the system will evolve differently if the driver choses to disregard a 
check engine light or a person ignores his body’s warning signs, the decision maker’s 
interpretation of the feedback will ultimately determine how the system progresses. The 
coup attempts in Iraq were often reported to be plagued by internal strife, mismanaged 
programs, and overzealous opposition leaders, yet the message the Clinton administration 
interpreted from the system was that the program was at least effective enough to 
continue. Feedback is subjective, it is the decision maker’s interpretation of the 
information the system conveys that matters. Whether the operations in Iraq were truly 
successful or not was largely irrelevant, it only mattered that Clinton and his key advisors 
interpreted the feedback to indicate they were more effective than other proposed policy 
options, leading to an inclination to approve additional covert actions.  
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There are generally two types of feedback, positive and negative. The terms 
“positive” and “negative” are not value judgments, they simply refer to changes in 
direction and can also be thought of as “same” and “opposite” feedback. Jervis best 
explains the difference:  
Feedback is positive or self-amplifying (and destabilizing) when a change 
in one direction sets in motion reinforcing pressures that produce further 
change in the same direction; negative or dampening (and stabilizing) 
when the change triggers forces that counteract the initial change and 
return the system to something like its original position.306  
Figure 18 portrays the two types of feedback. Positive feedback creates a spiraling 
loop as change in one direction produces change in the same direction. Negative feedback 
creates a balancing, or stabilizing loop, as change in one direction produces change in the 
opposite direction.  
 
Figure 18.  Types of feedback. 
Positive and negative feedback loops. 
Left unchecked, effective covert actions can produce positive feedback, leading to 
an increase in their use. As depicted in Figure 19, the more effective a tool is seen to be, 
the more apt a decision maker is to use it. Russian President Vladimir Putin may be 
experiencing the phenomena of positive feedback in Ukraine today. After months of civil 
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unrest in Kiev, then-President Viktor Yanukovych fled the country while the turmoil 
spread to Crimea and eastern Ukraine. At the same time, Putin launched a covert 
campaign to annex Crimea. As Russian leaders vowed to support a Crimean referendum 
to break away from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, armed men in military-style 
uniforms with no insignia appeared in Crimea fostering separatist aggression within the 
pro-Russian movement.307 Although Putin claimed that “Russian soldiers have not 
occupied government buildings and surrounded Ukrainian military bases on the Crimean 
Peninsula” and instead asserted that the men were “local self-defense forces,”308 evidence 
seemed to show otherwise. Internet images surfaced appearing to identify Russian 
soldiers in Georgia in 2008 as the same individuals in Crimea sans military insignia.309 
Despite the international outcry denouncing Russia’s intervention in the sovereign affairs 
of Ukraine, the covert invasion worked. Russia annexed Crimea without the use of overt 
military forces.  
Putin then turned his attention to eastern Ukraine and appeared to utilize the same 
tactics: Pro-Russian separatists were joined by armed groups who only superficially hid 
their ties to the Russian military.310 Russia’s covert paramilitary campaign to provide 
arms, training, and materiel support to the pro-Russian movement in eastern Ukraine 
caused little more than strongly worded denunciations from the international community. 
Even after the tragic shoot-down of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 and the death of all 298 
individuals on board in July of 2014, little response from the international community 
surfaced to cause Putin to curb his behavior. Starting with the initial covert incursions 
into Crimea, Putin appeared to be operating in a positive feedback loop: he considered 
the covert actions effective, which led to more intensive covert actions. Positive feedback 
is not necessarily the same as positive results and operating in a positive feedback loop 
does not eliminate, and may in fact enhance, the potential for negative consequences. The 
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recent election of a pro-Western legislation in Kiev was likely a result of Putin’s 
continued aggression in the eastern regions of Ukraine.311 A positive feedback loop 
simply means input in one element produces the same directional input in another 
element; an increase in perceived covert action effectiveness may lead to an increase in 
covert action usage.  
 
Figure 19.  Covert action positive feedback loop.  
An increase in the perceived effectiveness may lead to an increase in the use of covert 
action. 
Positive feedback loops in covert action can be the result of a type of capability 
creep. When covert actions are viewed as effective, as in Putin’s case, the inclination can 
be strong to use them more often. Negative feedback loops can emerge if an increase in 
effectiveness causes decision makers to resist the urge to transition the covert action to 
address other issues, and instead leads to a decrease in the use of the tool. By themselves, 
neither positive nor negative loops are good or bad. Policymakers must simply be aware 
of how the emerging feedback is influencing their decisional patterns and understand the 
implications of these feedback loops on future covert actions assessments.  
As feedback is affecting the decision maker within the system, it is also being 
expelled into the environment in the form of external feedback. The covert action 
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signature, the level of deniability a sponsor enjoys, is a reflection of feedback to the 
international system. External feedback ties the sponsoring agency to the visible action; 
some actions provide high levels of feedback to the environment while others provide 
very little. Russia’s covert excursions into Crimea and Ukraine resulted in significant 
levels of external feedback to the international community, it has been widely accepted 
that Russian forces were operating in eastern Ukraine despite Putin’s denials. Similarly, 
Israel’s assassination campaign targeting at least five Iranian nuclear scientists on the 
streets of Tehran since 2007 is a poorly kept secret.312 The U.S. and other nations have 
condemned the attacks but “the official reaction in Israel appeared to be more cryptic.”313  
In comparison to the signature recent Russian and Israeli operations have created, 
the covert action to take down the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) in the 1980s emitted 
very little environmental feedback. In this extremely effective counterterrorist covert 
operation, the ANO network was destroyed from within through a deception campaign 
that made Abu Nidal believe that “hundreds of his network members were cheating both 
him and the cause, so he rubbed them out.”314 So little feedback has emerged from this 
operation that almost a quarter-century later there are still only vague references to it in 
open source literature.  
A review of environmental feedback requires a quick discussion of the paradox of 
“overt-covert”315 operations. Covert action is, by definition, an activity designed to 
influence a target while the sponsor remains unknown or unacknowledged. However, a 
state may try to use external feedback to its advantage by intentionally exposing an 
ongoing covert action for psychological impact. According to a former CIA official, 
some of the operations targeting Saddam Hussein during the mid-1990s were “sort of a 
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covert op done in public.”316 The U.S. was not overly concerned about Iraqi double 
agents penetrating exile groups because, “we wanted Saddam to know we were doing 
these things.”317 The Israel assassination campaign referenced above may also 
intentionally be partly overt to send a message to the Iranian government. This tactic can 
be effective if the feedback to the international system is deliberate and controlled. 
However, unintentional “overt-covert” operations are counterproductive, defeating the 
purpose of the covert action. It remains to be seen whether the recent admission by 
“government sources familiar with the matter” of CIA support to both Syrian rebels318 
and Libyan militias319 was the result of a deliberate “overt-covert” tactic or an oversight 
regarding the factors requisite to successful deniability. Sometimes controlled leaks are 
effective; but to be effective it must be conscious and deliberate. Policymakers must be 
aware of the feedback a covert action is releasing to the international community. If 
external feedback is increasing unintentionally, adjustments should be made to the 
internal components of the system.  
Feedback allows policymakers within the system “to adjust future conduct by past 
performances”320 and provides a state  
some idea of how close it [the system] has come to its objectives and, if it 
desires to achieve a better approximation and has the capabilities for doing 
so, [the state] is in a position to seek to modify [the system’s] behavior 
with this end in view.321  
Through an understanding of feedback, actors are able to manipulate certain 
components of the system to attain a different result. If deniability is plummeting, actors 
can strengthen the cover story; if an objective is not being met, actors can change the type 
of action or reduce the operational constraints. But policymakers cannot properly adjust 
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the system without being alert to what the system is saying. It is imperative that system 
feedback is captured and addressed so that adjustments can be made as needed.  
Feedback can be captured through various means to include technical capabilities, 
human assets, and open source media. Open source, in the form of social media and 
mobile technology, has recently created an environment where the signature of a covert 
action is much easier to gauge but also where deniability is much more difficult to 
maintain. Few could have predicted the feedback role social media would play during the 
secret raid into Abbottabad, Pakistan on the night of May 1, 2011. As the SEAL raid was 
commencing, Sohaib Athar tweeted “Helicopters hovering above Abbottabad at 1AM (is 
rare event).”322 Over the next few hours, Athar and his followers discussed in 140 
characters what had taken place until, in realization, Athar tweeted “Uh oh, now I’m the 
guy who liveblogged the Osama raid without knowing it.”323 All this occurred almost 
two hours before President Obama announced to the world that Osama bin Laden was 
dead.324 Although the bin Laden raid was not a covert action since there was no intention 
of keeping the U.S. role unacknowledged, this raid does highlight the power that social 
media and mobile technology have on the signature of an operation. Policymakers need 
to be alert to the feedback an action is producing and ensure that measures are in place to 
capture and act on that feedback. Otherwise, the power of feedback is lost. 
D. CYBER—EMBRACING THE POWER OF FEEDBACK 
Recent advances in cyber technology have allowed planners to incorporate 
feedback directly into the covert action tool. The Stuxnet worm, deployed in the late-
2000s against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, was a highly effective operation that 
highlights how feedback can be an active component of a covert action plan.325 After 
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years of failed diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s nuclear aspirations, the potential for a 
military strike was being hotly debated;326 before kinetic strikes could be launched, 
however, “a sophisticated half-megabyte of computer code apparently accomplished what 
a half-decade of United Nations Security Council resolutions could not.”327 While the 
exact damage caused by the worm is unclear, some estimates claim it caused at least a 23 
percent reduction in the number of working centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility.328 
Stuxnet succeeded by employing feedback in three distinct ways, depicted in Figure 20 
below: manipulating the feedback seen by the Iranian officials, communicating feedback 
on the status to the sponsor, and controlling the external feedback to the international 
environment.  
Once inserted into the Iranian system, Stuxnet targeted the industrial control 
systems (ICS) that were designed to monitor and control physical operations at 
Natanz.329 The worm caused the centrifuges to drastically fluctuate spin rates at a level 
that would cause severe damage. This sophisticated computer code did not simply 
degrade the nuclear facilities; it did so while manipulating the feedback the facility 
controllers were receiving so they were unaware an attack was taking place. While 
causing the centrifuges to spin out of control, Stuxnet intercepted the warning signals the 
ICS was sounding and instead provided the controllers “deceptive feedback” that 
operations were commencing normally when the centrifuges were actually destroying 
themselves.330 In classic Hollywood-heist style, Stuxnet replaced the real surveillance 
video with “pre-recorded fake input signals.”331  
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Stuxnet also communicated with its sponsor while the mission was underway. It 
was “instructed to upload reports describing the machines it infected”332 in order to allow 
the sponsor to track its progress, similar to how “a commando team radios situation 
reports back to base.”333 While sponsors were able to track the worm’s progress, they 
were not able to control it sufficiently once it was released into the Iranian server. 
Communication with the worm did not equate to control of the worm and, unlike a 
commando team, there was no abort code. In fact, a primary reason the worm was 
exposed was that it spread well beyond the initial boundaries and caused collateral 
damage to surrounding systems. This internal feedback loop was incomplete, Stuxnet fed 
information back to the sponsor but was unable to receive information in return.  
Finally, even after Stuxnet spread to other systems, it initially emitted very little 
external feedback. One of the benefits of cyber weapons is their inherent non-
attributability. Early indications were simply that the “technology industry is being rattled 
by a quiet and sophisticated malicious software program”334 and security experts were at 
first unclear as to who or what was responsible and even what the intended target was. 
Based on the sophistication of the worm, it was quickly assumed to have originated from 
a government entity and after crowdsourcing a fix, the weapon was isolated and 
disarmed; but the damage had been done. Even with the most sophisticated cyber 
weapons, some feedback will inevitably enter the environment. However, as seen with 
Stuxnet, identifying the source and impact of an attack can be a lengthy process. 
Former CIA Director Michael Hayden claimed that Stuxnet was “the first attack 
of a major nature in which a cyberattack was used to effect physical destruction.”335 
Stuxnet may not have been sufficiently controllable once it was released, it may have 
been effectively disarmed once discovered, but, based on its deniability and destructive 
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power, it may also be a glimpse of the potential cyber technology has to offer covert 
actions.  
 
Figure 20.  Stuxnet feedback loops.  
Stuxnet feedback loops were established between the cyber code and the facility, the code 
and the controller, and the code and the sponsor. Note the feedback loop between the 
worm and the sponsor is incomplete. 
Cyber technology’s active use of feedback is not limited to “cybotage” operations. 
It has also been used in directed propaganda campaigns. In 2007, U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) developed the Iraqi Hero gaming program to target young 
Middle Eastern males. Iraqi Hero was a first-person shooter game based on the popular 
Call of Duty series; the objective of the game was to navigate through Baghdad while 
trying to thwart insurgent attacks. Players “won” if they were able to make it to police 
headquarters with attack plans stolen from the terrorist headquarters. The game was often 
given away at local bazaars on USB drives and was designed to influence the attitudes 
and opinions of a key demographic group in the region, military-aged males, to sway 
them away from supporting the insurgency. It also allowed USSOCOM to monitor who 
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and how many were downloading the games.336 Iraqi Hero and later spinoffs provided 
feedback to the player in the form of a video game while simultaneously providing 
feedback to the sponsor on how far and to whom the program was spreading. Like 
Stuxnet, the feedback loops in Iraqi Hero, shown in Figure 21, were incomplete as the 
sponsor was unable to adjust the code once it was downloaded; it is possible, however, 
that next generation games may complete the loop, providing more control with less 
attribution.  
 
Figure 21.  Iraqi Hero feedback loops. 
Iraqi Hero established feedback between the game and the player. Again note the 
feedback loop between the game and the sponsor is incomplete. 
Stuxnet and Iraqi Hero highlight how cyber technology can incorporate feedback 
directly into the covert tool. In both cases, the computer code created a feedback loop 
with the target and limited the attributable feedback being expelled to the external 
environment, all while passing status back to the sponsoring agency. The feedback loops 
to the sponsors were incomplete, the sponsors were able to receive information but were 
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unable to control the programs once they had been downloaded. Future iterations of these 
types of covert actions could foreseeably complete this loop, enhancing the sponsor’s 
ability to control and adjust the code while the covert action is underway.  
E. TRADEOFFS 
While feedback is the system’s output looping back as input, the two major 
tradeoffs, stakes versus innovation and deniability over time as it relates to effectiveness, 
are policy inputs that can create significantly different outputs. Feedback and tradeoffs 
may manifest in opposite ends of the system, but they are intricately linked through the 
covert action cycle. The tradeoff decision will influence the system’s interactions; 
feedback from those interactions will then return to the system, further changing the 
system and providing policymakers additional information on the overall status. These 
effects may also have considerable repercussions on not just the current covert action 
cycle but on future iterations as well. Because tradeoff decisions deal with innovative 
technology, national interests, and international credibility, they have the potential to 
resonate for years.  
1. Stakes Versus Innovation 
The first tradeoff in the covert action system is that of stakes versus innovation. 
The level of innovation of the tool used to conduct the operation should be commensurate 
with the stakes at risk because of the phenomena of innovation diffusion. A high stakes 
situation will warrant the use of an innovative tool; a low stakes situation typically should 
not. Once innovative technology is made public, it will start to diffuse and adversaries 
can begin to develop countermeasures, thereby reducing future effectiveness. But, on the 
other hand, electing not to employ a piece of innovative technology and withholding it 
until the “perfect time” arises can also reduce effectiveness since adversaries, through 
standard research and development processes, may create defenses against it. While this 
tradeoff does not solely apply to technology, the advances in cyber capabilities and their 
subsequent impact on covert actions makes understanding and acknowledging this 
tradeoff crucial to planning effective operations. There is no correct answer to this 
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dilemma; policymakers must strike a balance between the need to address today’s threats 
against maintaining a capability to counter tomorrow’s challenges. 
 A comparison of the Stuxnet in 2010 with the Russian-backed DDoS attacks in 
2007 and 2008 illustrates this tradeoff and is highlighted in Figure 22. The employment 
of Stuxnet, very innovative at the time, was justified because of the perceived threat of a 
nuclear-armed Iran. The stakes were high; therefore, the use of a highly innovative tool 
was warranted. The persistence of Stuxnet’s code for future situations was low, however, 
because once used, the technology diffused allowing defenses to be designed to counter 
it. Granted the Stuxnet code was never intended to enter the public domain and was 
inadvertently released onto the Internet, however, it is likely that Stuxnet’s sponsors 
understood that once deployed, the worm would eventually be discovered and reverse 
engineered. As evidence of technology diffusion, Iran has reportedly “beefed up its own 
cyber capabilities”337 following the attack. They have also been implicated by U.S. 
intelligence officials in the Shamoon cyber attacks on Saudi Aramco in 2012, presumably 
conducted in retaliation for Natanz.338 Despite these repercussions, the national interest at 
stake, specifically the threat of the Iranian nuclear program, justified the use of this 
highly innovative tool even though, in its current state, it would likely be a one-and-done 
weapon.339  
In comparison, Russia’s DDoS attacks in 2007340 and 2008341 are an example of 
relatively routine technology used to address a low stakes issues. Estonia and Georgia 
represented a minimal threat to Russia. Russia was by far the militarily superior power 
and neither Estonia nor Georgia could mount an effective counter against Russian 
aggression. Russia enhanced its military effectiveness by employing DDoS attacks in a 
combined-arms technique; however, in 2007, DDoS was already a relatively routine 
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capability and little advantage would have been gained by withholding its use.342 Russia 
likely possessed other, more innovative cyber weapons at the time, yet the stakes of the 
campaigns against Estonia and Georgia were at such a low level that there was no reason 
to publicize a more technologically advanced tool.  
 
Figure 22.  Tradeoff #1: Stakes versus degree of innovativeness of the tool. 
Tradeoff depicting the need to align the innovation of the tool with the level of the stakes. 
2. Deniability Over Time 
Most covert actions will, over time, be exposed. Some are outed through solid 
investigative journalism, some through a lack of understanding of the factors impacting 
deniability, and some are simply declassified once the need to maintain the cover is no 
longer necessary. Regardless of the reason, the risk of exposure over time generally 
increases. Each covert action has a particular exposure threshold that will fluctuate based 
on the level of deniability; this threshold designates when a sponsor can no longer 
credibly deny attribution. As per Figure 23 below, the time of exposure is determined by 
the point the exposure threshold is crossed. The higher the exposure threshold, the more 
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time a sponsor has to operate covertly; the lower the threshold, the less time. Deniability 
buys time; time provides freedom to operate. 
When exposure appears imminent, the decision maker has a choice. He can either 
shelve the operation to preserve the capability or cover; raise the exposure threshold by 
adjusting the deniability component to buy more time; continue under an “overt-covert” 
status where the state does not acknowledge sponsorship yet most parties tacitly accept 
the sponsor’s involvement; or lift the cover story and proceed overtly. Shutting down the 
operation will leave the objectives unmet yet deniability intact. Continuing in an “overt-
covert” or overt manner may still achieve the objectives but may negatively impact a 
state’s domestic or international credibility and prompt international condemnations, 
sanctions, or, worst case, aggressive retaliation. The way-ahead should be based on the 
objectives weighed against the expected blowback that will occur if a state proceeds 
under either an “overt-covert” or a purely overt status.  
There are situations when the reward of achieving the objectives will outweigh 
the risk of fallout. President Obama’s admission in May 2013 that “the United States has 
taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with 
remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones” is such a case.343 The U.S. 
could no longer credibly deny the operations were conducted by U.S. forces; however, 
the advantages of continuing an armed campaign against al Qaeda outweighed the 
disadvantages of discontinuing the operation. Closely monitoring external feedback will 
help policymakers determine when this decision should be made based on exposure 
appearing imminent, it will also provide insight to the potential fall out of continuing the 
operation under other-than-covert circumstances.  
                                                 




Figure 23.  Tradeoff #2: Deniability over time as it relates to effectiveness. 
Tradeoff depicting the relationship between deniability, effectiveness, and time. 
Regardless of a decision to proceed overtly, if the objectives are achieved, the 
action is effective. Exposure, intentional or not, does not necessarily equate to ineffective 
actions. There are many examples of effective operations despite thin or non-existent 
covers. The arming of the mujahedeen was a thinly veiled covert action yet still effective 
based on the accomplishment of the particular objective: forcing the Soviet military from 
Afghanistan. More recently, throughout much of 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
denied direct involvement in Crimea and Ukraine despite evidence that appeared to prove 
a large Russian military presence. While Russian deniability was low, the covert action 
was still highly effective. Despite the international community’s certainty that Russian 
forces were operating in Crimea, Putin’s denials bought enough time and provided 
enough plausible deniability to successfully annex the territory of a sovereign state. Putin 
likely understood the ramifications of his actions and when exposure of his forces was 
pending, he elected to proceed under an “overt-covert” umbrella. Evidently, the reward of 
Crimea was considered worth the risk of the international response. Interestingly, this 
example also illustrates the difference between effectiveness and success. Putin’s Ukraine 
campaign may have been effective, but based on the economic sanctions that have been 
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leveled against Russia as well as the recent elections in Kiev of a pro-Western legislature, 
the “success” of this policy is still undetermined. 
Both tradeoffs discussed above require input from decision makers and the 
choices made here can significantly impact the effectiveness of the current system as well 
as covert actions conducted in the future. There are no right answers to either tradeoff, 
only considerations to bear in mind as policymakers weigh all sides of the issue. 
Introducing new technology, assessing the relative importance of the objectives, affecting 
international credibility, and inviting international response or retaliation are all factors 
that will influence the decision maker. Only through a thorough comprehension of 
tradeoffs can policymakers understand the full advantages and disadvantages of the 
various courses of action available.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Understanding feedback and tradeoffs is essential to correctly applying covert 
action today. Feedback allows an actor to determine what has gone wrong, what has gone 
right, and how to adjust the system from there. Tradeoffs provide decision makers the 
opportunity to influence the direction of the current covert action system but also the 
potential to affect the system in the future. Covert actions are far too powerful to be fire-
and-forget weapons; it takes a keen, honest assessment of the feedback that is returning to 
the system and the tradeoff decisions required by the system to ensure the proper use of 
this complex tool.  
The transition from a bipolar world, accompanied by the advent of cyber 
technology, has arguably changed the role of covert action in many states national 
security strategies. While states no longer have the luxury of focusing on one main 
enemy, they now have a whole spectrum of new weapons to employ in the form of cyber 
capabilities against the range of enemies they face. Few other covert action tools are able 
to incorporate feedback quite like cyber technology and the potential of this emerging 
weapon is only beginning to be realized.  
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VI. BRIDGING THE GAP—FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The systems approach to covert action can provide useful insights to 
policymakers; but these insights may be lost unless the abstract concept is converted to 
real-world application. Just as theories of international relations are not foreign policies, 
the systems approach is not in itself a strategy. This thesis has aimed to provide a new 
way to think about covert action; but to realize the full potential of this approach it must 
now be transitioned from theory to practice.  
Alexander George speaks of “bridging the gap”344 between scholars and 
policymakers to reduce the gulf that separates theory from praxis and conceptual models 
from practical solutions. This chapter will use George’s step-down format to illustrate 
how the abstract covert action systems approach can be converted to a relevant covert 
strategy. First, the “gap” will be explained and the “three types of knowledge” needed to 
bridge it will be introduced: conceptual, general, and specific.345 Next, the systems model 
that has been developed throughout this study will be reviewed, focusing on the covert 
action system diagram, system effects, feedback, and tradeoffs. This abstract concept will 
then be transitioned to the general knowledge required to apply the model and six 
“favoring conditions”346 will be proposed. To complete the bridge, a few points to 
consider when using these “favoring conditions” to develop a situation-specific strategy 
will be briefly discussed. Finally, recommendations for additional areas of study will be 
suggested. Scholarship can only be “an aid, not a substitute” for policy development,347 
but as states will likely continue to employ covert action in their national security 
strategies, increasing the scholarly understanding of this complex and dynamic tool may 
lead to more effective application.  
                                                 
344 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory & Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), xiii. 
345 George, Bridging the Gap, xvii. 
346 George, Bridging the Gap, 122. 
347 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 276. 
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B. BRIDGING THE GAP 
According to George, a gap exists between scholars and policymakers. Scholars 
are seen by some as “too academic, all too often prone to abstraction and jargon” while 
policymakers are “too haphazard and ad hoc in their approaches and too ready to apply 
pat formulas or supposed lessons of history in uncritical ways.”348 This disconnect 
constrains effective communication between the two communities and inhibits the 
development of foreign policy based in sound theory. The gulf between abstract, 
conceptual models developed by scholars and the specific policy-relevant information 
required by policymakers can be wide, but to further the pursuit of effective foreign 
policy, it must be bridged.  
George proposes that the best way to link these two communities is to focus on 
the relationship between knowledge and action. The gap between theory and practice is a 
gap between knowledge and action. At the risk of oversimplification, academics create 
knowledge and policymakers take action. Unfortunately, the knowledge created by some 
scholars “offers little insight into how decision makers can choose policy instruments to 
influence outcomes.”349 To solve this dilemma, theoretical concepts must be “stepped-
down” to policy-relevant strategies. Three types of knowledge can assist policymakers 
here: conceptual understanding of abstract theories; general ideas of the “favoring 
conditions”350 that, when followed, typically lead to successful outcomes; and situation-
specific, real-world information.351 If a policymaker starts with a broad appreciation of 
the conceptual theory an issue demands, understands the general knowledge associated 
with that theory, and incorporates specific, timely information, a more effective strategy 
can be formed. 
Conceptual understanding of an abstract theory is the first step in policy 
development. The abstract model provides a “basic framework” and identifies the 
                                                 
348 Samuel W. Lewis, as cited in George, Bridging the Gap, ix. 
349 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 265. 
350 George, Bridging the Gap, 122. 
351 George refers to actor-specific behavior models as his third type of knowledge. He discusses the 
requirement of a “correct image” in understanding one’s adversary before proceeding. This thesis broadens 
that concept to refer to situation-specific knowledge in general. 
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“general logic”352 of a policy instrument but its usefulness to real-world application is, by 
itself, limited. Broad theories are explanatory at a grand scale and help frame the issue to 
focus the thinker but they provide little additional guidance beyond general abstraction. 
For example, deterrence theory is not a strategy; it merely explains the “general logic”353 
of this type of international influence. To deter aggression by an adversary, the abstract 
concept of deterrence provides a useful starting point; to be applicable, however, 
statesmen must convert the theory into a specific policy. The distinction may appear 
minor at first, but a look at the theoretical concepts outlined in Thomas Schelling’s The 
Strategy of Conflict or Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics354 will quickly 
illustrate the limited use of broad theory for daily national security considerations.  
“Conditional generalizations” and “favoring conditions”355 help link abstract 
theories to “useable knowledge”356 by outlining generalities that have been discovered 
through historical analysis. Within the complex, systemic world of international relations, 
success is rarely determined by one causal factor; instead, positive outcomes are the 
product of the interaction of certain conditions. Historical study can help identify these 
“favoring conditions”357 that, when present, typically lead to successful strategic 
outcomes. These conditions are neither deterministic nor probabilistic and should not be 
thought of as necessary or sufficient for success, but they do provide guidelines for 
policymakers to follow when formulating sound policy. Returning to the deterrence 
theory example, the general knowledge associated with deterrence, developed through 
years of historical study, includes such “conditional generalizations” as the need to 
establish credibility, the requirement of a second-strike capability, the means to 
                                                 
352 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 270. 
353 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 270. 
354 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960) and 
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). 
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communicate threats, and the value of reputation.358 These simple guidelines neither 
guarantee success nor provide policymakers with a specific strategy; they merely offer 
points to consider that have proven historically effective.  
The final type of knowledge required to complete the transition from theory to 
practice is that information which is specific to the situation. There is no formatted 
approach to security issues and despite similar looking circumstances policymakers must 
avoid the temptation to apply carbon-copy solutions. Academia can assist in the 
development of policy-relevant theories but it is the practitioner that has the “difficult 
task of adapting the available general knowledge about a given strategy or a foreign 
policy undertaking to the particular case at hand.”359 Creating situation-specific strategies 
based on a theoretical foundation while incorporating historically-proven guidelines is 
not a simple task, but the risks in not utilizing all available scholarship when formulating 
policy are too great.  
C. THE COVERT ACTION SYSTEM AS A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The covert action systems approach is a “middle-range” conceptual model that is 
“narrower in scope” than highly general theories “but closer to types and forms of 
knowledge needed in policymaking.”360 It is focused exclusively on providing a different 
way to think about this very specific form of statecraft. By looking at the covert action 
system diagram, system effects, feedback, and tradeoffs, this model offers a holistic 
perspective that emphasizes the interactions and interplay of the whole as opposed to an 
isolated concentration on the individual components. Further, it urges analysts to consider 
how the various elements interact and influence each other in dynamic ways to create 
emergent, complex behavior that cannot be understood through basic linear thinking. A 
covert action is much more than simply “method” plus “cover story” aimed at “target;” 
this type of reductionist thinking can lead to misunderstanding and misapplication. In 
                                                 
358 Conditional generalizations and favoring conditions are not always universally accepted facts. 
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reality, the “method” used to conduct a covert action will affect the plausibility of the 
“cover story” which may in turn change the behavior of the “target;” the subsequent 
reaction from the “target” may require a reconsideration of the “method” employed 
which will further affect the plausibility of the “cover story.” In other words, the 
relationships within the system are much more complex than A plus B and the outcome 
of those relationships can often be far different than C.  
A systems approach, by definition, requires seeing the entire system; therefore, 
unnecessary compartmentalization is anathema to this type of analysis. Within the 
intelligence field, some compartmentalization is understandably required due to security 
requirements but over-compartmentalization can be problematic. Compartmentalization 
leads to reductionist thinking; reductionist thinking leads to simplification; simplification 
may lead to misapplication. Policymakers need to be aware that critical insights can be 
lost if one is unable to view the whole structure and should strive for a balance between 
security restrictions and system oversight. 
1. System Diagram 
The system diagram is a simple illustration of complexity. It allows policymakers 
to visualize the critical components and comprehend the internal interactions within the 
system without resorting to reductionist thinking. Jervis points out that, while most 
people understand the world is not determined by mere cause and effect relationships, 
there is a tendency to simplify complex interactions for ease of understanding.361 
Unfortunately, oversimplification of complexity leads to an underestimation of the power 
of interactions. By providing a visual representation of the interactions of the 
components, the diagram helps policymakers avoid overgeneralization and instead 
captures the system’s complex nature while eliminating the chaff that could derail 
focused analysis.  
It is important to note that the system diagram is not a map and should not be 
viewed as a formulaic policy tool. One cannot take the system diagram, fill in the blanks, 
and follow it to a successful outcome. It is, instead, intended solely to provide a 
                                                 
361 Jervis, System Effects, 3. 
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conceptual understanding of the interactions occurring within the system. Systems 
behavior is dynamic and rarely can precise determination be expected. But a visual 
picture of the complexity of the system will offer a better idea of how component 
interplay influences effectiveness.  
2. System Effects 
The interactions depicted by the system diagram create emergent properties, “a 
characteristic that could not possibly have been deduced from the nature of its 
components.”362 One cannot simply add internal components together to determine the 
result; component interactions change the inherent structure and dynamic characteristics 
of the system and therefore, “the whole is different from, not greater than, the sum of the 
parts.”363 Jervis identifies four system effects that characterize these complex 
interactions: many effects are delayed and indirect; relations are often not bilateral; 
interactions are not additive; and outcomes do not always align with intentions.364  
Understanding these system effects can help policymakers better appreciate the 
potential for unintended consequences. It may not be possible to control or precisely 
predict system effects, but acknowledging that systems can behave in ways that 
drastically diverge from expectations may help policymakers determine when a covert 
policy is warranted or when other forms of influence would yield a more desired result. 
Knowledge of system effects also allows for better assessment of risks and stakes and 
will assist policymakers in reaching an equilibrium between the two. Finally, an 
awareness of the type of effects that may manifest from the system’s interactions will 
help policymakers remain cognizant of the potential for external changes produced by the 
system and adjust the strategy accordingly.  
                                                 
362 Jervis, System Effects, 16. 
363 Jervis, System Effects, 13. 
364 Jervis, System Effects, 29. 
 123 
3. Feedback 
Feedback is one of the most basic yet central features to the systems approach. 
Feedback is the driving force of the system, the “return of information”365 that changes 
the system’s direction, environment, and overall structure. Covert action system feedback 
takes two forms: internal and external. Internal feedback allows policymakers to ascertain 
how close the system is to achieving the stated objectives and adjust as required. External 
feedback, on the other hand, transmits information to the environment in the form of 
operational signature and allows the policymaker to determine the system’s level of 
deniability. Both types of feedback alert users to the system’s status and provide the 
opportunity to adjust behavior while the system is in execution. If policymakers do not 
closely monitor feedback, however, the opportunity to manipulate the system to achieve a 
different result will be lost. Systems communicate, it is up to policymakers to listen and 
act. 
4. Tradeoffs 
The final concept to consider is the effect that tradeoff decisions have on the 
outcome. This study introduced two tradeoffs that require inputs from decision makers 
that may have far-reaching effects: stakes versus innovation; and deniability over time as 
it relates to effectiveness. The first tradeoff, stakes versus innovation, highlights the idea 
that innovation of the instrument applied should be commensurate with the national 
interest at stake. Technology will quickly diffuse after it is used. Therefore, states should 
reserve their most innovative capabilities until the stakes warrant its use.  
The second tradeoff, deniability over time as it relates to effectiveness, illustrates 
that the level of deniability an action maintains determines the time available to conduct 
that action covertly. It also reiterates the notion that covert action effectiveness is based 
on achieving the stated objectives; as long as the objectives are met, the action is 
effective. However, that does not imply that deniability is an insignificant factor. When 
exposure appears imminent, policymakers must determine whether accomplishing the 
objective is worth the risk of the blowback that will occur upon exposure.  
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Both tradeoffs provide the opportunity to redirect the system and the choices 
made here can resonate for years. Decisions that affect the diffusion of innovative 
technology, the achievement of objectives deemed essential to national security, and the 
extent of blowback resulting from an operation can have significant impact on the uses of 
covert action in the future. Policymakers and decision makers should be aware of how 
their decisions will influence not only the present covert action system but future systems 
as well. 
All four of these concepts—the system diagram, system effects, feedback, and 
tradeoffs—provide a level of abstract understanding of the covert action system. By 
expanding the focus from an isolated, event-centric view to a holistic, structure-centric 
perspective, policymakers can garner a better appreciation of the nuances associated with 
covert action. But in order to move beyond appreciation of subtleties to a better 
employment of the tool, the broad conceptual model must be transitioned to more general 
“useable knowledge.”366  
D. GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF COVERT ACTION SYSTEMS 
This two-century survey of covert action via a “systems lens” helps highlight 
certain “favoring conditions”367 that have historically enabled effective covert policies. 
These conditions provide guidance for policymaker and offer handholds to grasp when 
formulating strategy. Guidelines cannot be confused with guarantees, however. Even 
though “the more favoring conditions in a case, the more likely is success,”368 George 
notes that simply following these guidelines does not guarantee effectiveness. 
Complexity within the system can never be completely eliminated; but if a strategy is 
developed with the following conditions in mind, the chances of success will increase. 
Conversely, if an ad hoc approach is taken with little regard to theoretical foundations or 
historical experience, the result could be far from desired—even disastrous.  
                                                 
366 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 269. 
367 George, Bridging the Gap, 122. 
368 George, Bridging the Gap, 122. 
 125 
1. Nest within Existing Foreign Policy 
The first condition that supports strategic success is nesting a covert strategy 
within existing policy. The covert action system is one of many that make up the foreign 
policy meta-system; to gain the most out of these various systems, all should be in 
harmony. If one is churning against the rest or operating in isolation, the meta-system 
will not be performing to its maximum potential. This need for unity of effort can be 
illustrated by comparing the foreign policy system to a collegiate crew team: if seven 
rowers are moving together and the eighth is rowing in the opposite direction, the boat’s 
momentum will be slowed. Similarly, if only one rower on the team is performing while 
the other seven are at a standstill, the boat will be moving at only a fraction of its 
potential speed. If diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts are all pushing a 
state’s policy in one direction while a covert action is working in the opposite direction, 
little success can be expected. Similarly, if the only effort a state is exerting is through a 
covert program, movement will be slow. Policy and strategy integration is key; history 
has shown that a foreign policy goal is more likely to be accomplished if the covert action 
is embedded within the larger foreign policy system.  
To truly enhance national security, effective covert operations should operate as a 
supporting effort to other policy tools. It should be noted that this has not, and will not, 
always be the case. During the “golden age”369 of U.S. covert action immediately 
following World War Two, covert actions were sometimes successful as the main effort. 
The coup in Iran is perhaps the best-known case of a stand-alone covert action leading to 
strategic success. As the keystone to U.S. foreign policy in that country, the coup opened 
the door for the application of other tools of influence to further American interests in the 
region for 25 years. Today, however, covert actions on such a grand scale will be rare. 
Stuxnet and the Abu Nidal Organization takedown are more likely representative of the 
future of covert action: nested programs within larger foreign policy initiatives. As stand-
alone operations, they were effective, that is, they met the system’s objectives; as part of 
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larger programs and in concert with other efforts, they also supported strategic counter-
proliferation and counterterrorism policy goals. 
Covert actions can have very expansive, far-reaching effects; they do not, as some 
have argued, need to be limited in their objectives.370 The victory of the Christian 
Democratic Party in the Italian national elections in 1948 and the success of the 
mujahedeen against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan in the 1980s illustrate that covert 
strategies can be very effective in supporting broad foreign policy goals. But these 
initiatives alone did not achieve the objectives; both operations were subsets of larger 
policies. The Italian election operation was conducted under the umbrella of the Marshall 
Plan and the mujahedeen support was a blatant “overt-covert” action that paralleled the 
internal decay of the Soviet state. Both of these operations are common examples of 
“successful” covert operations but it is important to remember that they were executed in 
concert with other U.S. efforts. The intrigue surrounding covert action often overshadows 
the reality: that covert actions used in conjunction with other policy tools can be more 
effective than if used in isolation. When used alone, the results are often limited; but 
when they are in support of larger foreign policy initiatives, the effects can be far-
reaching.  
2. Deliberate Use  
Covert action should be deliberately applied to a foreign policy issue, not used as 
a default or “last resort” strategy simply because more overt measures are deemed too 
difficult or problematic. The burden-of-proof of a proposed covert approach should be on 
“why covert” instead of “why not.” First answering the question “Why covert?” will help 
policymakers positively identify the benefits they hope to gain from a covert strategy and 
perhaps highlight other tools of influence and potential overt strategies that may have 
been overlooked. If an objective can be achieved overtly with acceptable consequences, 
then an overt approach should be considered. Even if overt means are available, covert 
action may still be a preferred method for a variety of reasons. Stuxnet, for example, was 
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preferred over a kinetic military strike. Stuxnet, therefore, adequately addressed the 
burden-of-proof requirement. Conversely, it is unclear if arming the Syrian and Libyan 
rebels via a presidential finding can adequately answer the “Why Covert?” question or if 
other avenues of support are available to further U.S. interests in these regions. Covert 
action can be a powerful option to address foreign policy issues, but it should only be 
employed when the situation demands, not because it is seen as an easy answer or 
because the mechanisms are in place.  
Policymakers must avoid the temptation to unnecessarily resort to covert policies. 
The Bay of Pigs debacle is a perfect example of policymakers’ overreliance on covert 
means. The operation was, by the time it launched, much closer to an overt amphibious 
invasion than a covert paramilitary operation. Battalions of dissidents supported by a 
rebel air force to invade a sovereign nation with the expressed intent to overthrow the 
existing government should never have proceeded under the conditions that it did. 
Unfortunately, misplaced optimism in the idea of “covertness,” and an overreliance on an 
unrelated, yet successful, historical experience, were both factors in President Kennedy’s 
approval of the ill-fated mission.371 A “covert” invasion of Cuba was an “easy answer” 
that led to devastating results, yet in retrospect, the internal logic of the covert decision 
does not hold up to scrutiny. If policymakers cannot adequately answer why an operation 
should be conducted via covert means, as it would have been difficult to in the Bay of 
Pigs scenario, then they may be in danger of abusing the capability. 
3. Capture Feedback and Adjust 
Systems communicate through feedback and that feedback must be monitored. By 
ensuring mechanisms are in place to capture both internal and external feedback, 
policymakers can more closely track the status of the system. Mechanisms to capture 
feedback can be as sophisticated as observing the measures and systems intelligence 
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emanating from a facility to as simple as monitoring a Twitter account. Regardless of the 
level of sophistication, feedback can be a covert action game-changer since it allows for 
the adjustment of the system while in execution. If that feedback is not captured, 
however, the opportunity is lost and the system may evolve in a direction that is 
undesired or unanticipated. Therefore, it is imperative that the means to capture feedback 
are incorporated in the planning phase of any action.  
The Stuxnet cyber worm is an example of how current technology can integrate 
both internal and external feedback directly into the covert tool. Stuxnet worked by 
directing a change in the spin rate of the nuclear centrifuges. It then manipulated the 
status that was being communicated to the Iranian nuclear scientists while simultaneously 
providing accurate updates to the sponsor. As technology innovations continue, cyber 
weapons will likely become more common. A capability that allows direct and immediate 
two-way communication between a cyber “actor,” a sponsor, and a target with minimal 
risk of interception has the potential to transform the covert world. Regardless of the 
level of technology a covert tool encompasses, however, the critical importance of 
capturing and responding to feedback will continue to be a core component to covert 
action effectiveness.  
4. Maintain Organizational Control 
Maintaining tight control over those organizations tasked with carrying out covert 
operations is crucial to preserving the integrity of the capability. While it is feasible that 
organizations outside the CIA could execute covert policy, this must be a careful, 
deliberate decision by those with the experience and knowledge to understand the 
benefits and drawbacks of venturing outside the established covert structure. The CIA has 
almost seven decades of experience with covert action—not all of it good—in which it 
has developed the requisite institutional experience, culture, infrastructure, and processes 
necessary to plan and conduct effective operations.  
The experience of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
their failed ZunZuneo project in Cuba highlights the problems of a half-cocked operation 
conducted by an inexperienced organization not designed to operate in the shadows. 
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ZunZuneo was a failed attempt to build a Twitter-like social media site in Cuba to 
encourage open communication amongst Cubans that, as reported by the Associated 
Press, could eventually lead to the creation of “smart mobs” to foment political unrest.372 
Despite an internal contractor memo that directed “there will be absolutely no mention of 
United States government involvement,” government spokesmen deny ZunZuneo was a 
covert operation and instead claim it was simply “discreet.”373 Definitional technicalities 
aside, it appears that ZunZuneo was a tepid attempt to reap the benefits of a covert 
approach without truly comprehending the inherent complexities involved. As James 
Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies claimed, it was “amateur-hour 
covertness, which is to say that it wasn’t very covert.”374 ZunZuneo was “amateur-hour” 
precisely because it was conducted by amateurs. Granted, the “professionals” in the 
nation’s covert agencies have a long record of covert action blunders as well, but these 
professional likely have a deeper understanding of the capability than those in USAID 
and therefore could have avoided some of the pitfalls into which USAID fell. Based on 
media reports, it does not appear that there were any casualties beyond U.S. reputation 
through embarrassing exposure. However, it is not inconceivable to fear that the Cuban 
regime may have had a much sharper response to those who were unwittingly involved in 
the program.  
Much has also been written recently about the Pentagon’s increased role in covert 
action. Outside of the declared theater of active armed conflict, Pentagon involvement in 
covert operations should be very carefully considered. Various ethical, moral, and legal 
restrictions surround the use of military personnel in covert activities, not least of which 
is potential violation of the Geneva Convention. Perhaps the biggest concern of the 
expansion of the Pentagon’s covert capability, from an organizational perspective, is the 
seeming ability to bypass established approval processes. Pentagon covert activities are 
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often conducted under a broad definition of “traditional military activities”375 which 
effectively bypasses the statutory processes established by the 1974 Hughes-Ryan 
Amendment. Decision makers need to treat this with extreme care. The current 
authorization and approval processes are in place because of serious blowback that 
occurred due, in some parts, to lack of oversight; circumventing this process through a 
flexible definition of what constitutes “traditional military activities” could result in more 
covert fallout.376  
Admittedly, “cybotage” missions offer a new twist to organizational 
responsibility. Stuxnet was a watershed moment for international conflict, ushering in an 
era when an undetected computer code can now impart physical damage to existing 
infrastructure. With the advent of cyber technology, organizations conducting covert 
action will likely expand beyond a CIA monopoly to more cyber-centric units. Further 
research into the implications of both the Pentagon’s use of covert action and changes the 
cyber era may bring to the covert system is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the 
foundation of the system should remain essentially unchanged regardless of the 
organization conducting the operation. Covert actions, whether conducted by the CIA or 
any other state organization, should follow the same approval and authorization processes 
to ensure that the tool is being applied correctly. The capability has far too much potential 
to end in disaster for tight organizational control not to be maintained. 
5. Expect Exposure 
At some point, almost all covert activities will be exposed; therefore, 
policymakers need to plan for this eventuality. Treverton speaks of the “New York Times 
test”377 and recommends that before taking action, policymakers should consider the 
fallout that will occur when, not if, the covert action is above the fold of the morning 
newspaper. In a world of instant communications and 24-hour media outlets, external 
feedback is becoming much more difficult to control and exposure is almost guaranteed. 
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As demonstrated by the man who live-tweeted the bin Laden raid, even the most 
secretive operations can be quickly exposed by a single individual with a smartphone.  
Expecting exposure reiterates the requirement for covert actions to be nested. If a 
covert operation is nested in existing overt foreign policy, exposure will be more 
acceptable. It is when a covert action is in conflict with existing policy and statutes, as 
was the Iran-Contra Affair when Reagan’s National Security Council supported the 
Nicaraguan Contras by selling arms to Iran, that exposure leads to serious breaches of 
public trust. There are many legitimate reasons for a state to enact a covert strategy, but 
operating covertly simply to avoid difficult public debate is likely a recipe for disaster. 
Expecting exposure and planning for that eventuality before it occurs can help 
policymakers confirm the covert activity is in line with state policies. If it is not, 
intentional or otherwise, policymakers should either reconsider the strategy or ensure the 
decision maker is prepared for the eventual exposure.  
6. Understand Tradeoffs 
Finally, it is important for planners to understand the two main tradeoffs in the 
covert action system. An appreciation of the tradeoff of stakes versus innovation and the 
tradeoff of exposure over time as it relates to effectiveness will help practitioners make 
more informed planning decisions. Without an understanding of these tradeoffs, 
policymakers cannot hope to best utilize the system to its greatest potential. 
The Stuxnet case illustrates the first tradeoff between stakes and innovation. The 
stakes of a nuclear-armed Iran were deemed high enough to warrant the use of this highly 
innovative, highly sophisticated computer worm. After it infected the Iranian systems, 
however, it was inadvertently released onto the open Internet which allowed cyber 
specialists to reverse-engineer the technology in an open forum, providing adversaries the 
information needed to develop defenses. The tool worked, but in its present state, it will 
unlikely work to such effect a second time. If retarding the Iranian nuclear program had 
not been deemed critical enough to warrant the use of the code, the sponsor would likely 
have refrained from using it; however, holding the code in reserve could have allowed 
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adversary states time to naturally develop countermeasures against it, essentially 
defeating it before it could be deployed.  
Putin’s actions in eastern Ukraine are a timely illustration of the second tradeoff 
between time, deniability, and effectiveness. As the annexation of Crimea shows, even 
thinly veiled covert activities can still be highly effective.378 Policymakers need to 
understand what factors impact deniability and how deniability subsequently determines 
the time available for freedom of movement. Furthermore, once an operation is nearing 
exposure, decision makers should make a conscious choice to shut down the operation, 
continue as an “overt covert” operation as Russia did in Ukraine,379 or proceed overtly as 
the U.S. has done with the drone program against al Qaeda.380 Effectiveness can still be 
achieved after an operation is uncovered but the blowback of proceeding overtly must be 
weighed against the drawbacks of shutting down the operation without achieving the 
objectives. 
Both tradeoffs require a balance between the risk and rewards of the objective and 
the decision can only be made on a case-by-case basis. There are no correct answers to 
covert action tradeoff decisions, only considerations to bear in mind as policymakers are 
determining a course of action. 
These six conditions outlined above do not guarantee either success or 
effectiveness; they simply provide a type of “checklist”381 to ensure policy is being 
formulated in a deliberate manner. Because of the complex nature of systems, rarely will 
universal conditions be present that determine if A then B. Instead, these “conditional 
generalizations” provide policymakers an idea of the more important factors to consider 
                                                 
378 Will Englund, “Kremlin Says Crimea is Now Officially Part of Russia After Treaty Signing, Putin 
Speech,” The Washington Post, March 21, 2014. This annexation came after Putin repeatedly denied 
Russian forces were in Crimea. Bill Chappell and Mark Memmott, “Putin Says Those Aren’t Russian 
Forces in Crimea,” National Public Radio, March 4, 2014. 
379 Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Displays a New Military Prowess in Ukraine’s East,” The New York 
Times, April 21, 2014. 
380 President Obama announced in a speech at the National Defense University that “the United States 
has taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted 
aircraft commonly referred to as drones.” This program was previously unacknowledged by government 
officials. The White House, "Remarks by the President at the National Defense University," May 23, 2013.  
381 George, Bridging the Gap, 125. 
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when constructing a covert action strategy. If some or all of these favoring conditions 
cannot be incorporated into situation-specific strategies, decision makers may be better 
served recommending a different approach.  
E. SITUATION-SPECIFIC POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
The conceptual framework and general knowledge outlined above offer 
policymakers a foundation upon which to build a situation-specific strategy. It is up to 
them to integrate this knowledge with the details of the case at hand. Scholarship can help 
expand the knowledge base of a concept but it is the policymaker who must take the 
final, and arguably most difficult, step: strategy development. Theory and knowledge can 
only provide guidance and insight, it cannot replace real-time information or personal 
judgment.  
Every policy decision is, of course, based on much more than strategic rationality; 
political concerns will nearly always be present in a decision process and the “best” 
strategy may be rejected due to considerations far outside the boundaries of the covert 
action system. Increasing the knowledge base of policymakers, however, can limit some 
of the more dangerous political inputs. As George notes, “when policy-relevant 
knowledge is available, it can discipline and constrain the unfettered play of political 
factors in policymaking.”382 Politics will rarely be eliminated in any policy decision but 
enhancing the education of those tasked with formulating policy can perhaps limit the 
negative influence political factors may have on the final product. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL STUDY 
Covert actions will likely remain a core component of many states foreign 
policies. Those wishing to develop “policy-applicable theory”383 should continue to build 
upon the foundation required to better apply this tool. The primary focus of this thesis 
was on George’s first two types of knowledge, conceptual and general, while the details 
of policy development were only briefly discussed. Now that the conceptual and general 
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frameworks have been advanced, a closer look at the specifics of formuluating covert 
action strategy could further enhance the applicability of this model.  
Further exploration of international use covert action is also needed. The few 
examples that were examined suggest that the lessons of the systems approach is 
generalizable across international boundaries but it is so far unclear how close other 
states follow the conceptual model set forth or if other actors have developed a 
significantly different approach to covert action. This study has focused exclusively on 
the use of covert action by nation-states, bypassing those cases of covert operations 
executed by networks and non-states actors. A closer look at covert actions by non-states 
could yield insights not yet realized. The impact of cyber technology on the covert 
system can also be further studied. Cyber will likely have a revolutionary impact on inter-
state relations and focusing on cyber integration into the existing covert structure could 
advance understanding into how this new technology could better support foreign policy. 
Finally, a closer look at the emerging use of covert action by organizations outside the 
CIA could help highlight areas of overlap, redundancy and possible integration.  
This thesis was only the starting point of a systems approach to covert action. 
While it provided useful insights by synchronizing and integrating previous approaches 
into a comprehensive model, there is still much room for additional study.  
G. CONCLUSION 
As nation-states continue to address varied threats to their national security, 
covert action will likely continue to be integrated into their respective foreign policies. 
This thesis aimed to provide a fresh perspective—the systems approach—when 
considering covert activities in response to security concerns. By helping policymakers 
become more aware of the complexities of the covert action system and encouraging 
them to expand their thinking from isolated events to holistic structures, this powerful 
tool of statecraft may be better applied against, and with greater effects upon, those who 
pose threats to peace and security. 
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